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Introduction
The Bill of Rights does not apply to tribal governments. Instead,
restraints on tribal power are imposed exclusively by tribal and federal law.
Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”) to require
tribes to extend specific civil rights guarantees in Indian Country, including
enumerated procedural protections to tribal court criminal defendants.1
ICRA’s criminal procedure requirements, to some extent, mirror those
found in the Bill of Rights. But, the criminal procedure required in tribal
court under ICRA is not always equivalent to what the U.S. Constitution
requires in state and federal court.
In addition to mandating specific procedural protections in tribal court
criminal prosecutions, ICRA limits the sentencing authority of tribal courts.
As enacted in 1968, ICRA limited tribal courts’ sentencing authority to
misdemeanor-type penalties—six months’ imprisonment and a fine of
$500, later raised to one year and $5,000 —even for the most serious tribal
offenses.2 In 2010 Congress amended ICRA with the Tribal Law and Order
Act (“TLOA”).3 The TLOA amendments to ICRA raised tribal courts’
sentencing authority to three years and $15,000 and explicitly authorized
stacking sentences in certain cases, up to a total of nine years.4 Congress
amended ICRA again when it passed the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013 (“VAWA 2013”).5 For the first time since
Congress began restricting tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in
the late 1700s,6 VAWA 2013 authorized tribes to exercise criminal
1. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 13011303 (2012)).
2. Id. § 202, 82 Stat. at 77 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 1302).
3. Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat. 2261 (codified in scattered sections of 25
U.S.C.).
4. Id. § 234, 124 Stat. at 2280 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)).
5. Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
6. At the founding, tribes had plenary authority to punish anyone who violated tribal
law on tribal land, including non-Indians. Congress began delimiting tribes’ criminal
jurisdiction in 1790, right after the Constitution was ratified. See infra Part II. Thus, it is
more accurate to describe the TLOA and VAWA 2013 amendments to have affected a
restoration of tribes’ organic authority, rather than a grant or extension of such authority.
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jurisdiction over some non-Indians who commit specified domestic
violence offenses against Indians7 in Indian Country.8
Tribes seeking to exercise TLOA increased sentencing authority and
VAWA 2013 expanded jurisdiction must first provide tribal court criminal
defendants with additional specific procedural protections not required
under ICRA’s default provisions. In both TLOA and VAWA 2013
proceedings, these additional protections include requirements that tribes
appoint counsel at public expense to indigent defendants, ensure defendants
receive effective assistance of counsel as defined by the federal
constitution, provide law-licensed judges, make tribal criminal laws and
rules publicly available, and create a record of tribal court proceedings.9 In
addition, tribal courts seeking to exercise VAWA 2013 jurisdiction must
provide defendants an impartial jury, as defined by the federal
constitutional standard, and “all other rights whose protection is necessary
under the Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to
recognize and affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe to
exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the
defendant.”10
At first blush, the TLOA and VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA appear
to mirror requirements imposed on state and federal courts by the Bill of
7. The term “Indian” has multiple definitions in federal law. This article uses the term
“Indian” as it is defined by the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4)
(2012) (“‘Indian’ means any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States as an Indian under section 1153, Title 18, [the Major Crimes Act] . . . .”). Although
ICRA relies on the Major Crimes Act (“MCA”) in defining “Indian,” the MCA does not
define that term. Rather, the meaning of “Indian” for purposes of federal criminal
jurisdiction under the MCA has been “judicially explicated.” United States v. Zepeda, 792
F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (noting that an element of a MCA offense is proof that
defendant has “Indian blood,” whether or not that blood tie is to a federally recognized tribe)
(citations and quotations marks omitted); see also WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 9-10 (5th ed. 2009); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S
MANUAL § 686 (1997) (“To be considered an Indian, one generally has to have both ‘a
significant degree of blood and sufficient connection to his tribe to be regarded [by the tribe
or the government] as one of its members for criminal jurisdiction purposes. A threshold
test, however, is whether the tribe with which affiliation is asserted is a federally
acknowledged tribe.’”) (citations omitted).
8. VAWA 2013, tit. IX, § 904, 127 Stat. at 120 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B)
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90)).
9. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, § 234(c), 124
Stat. 2261, 2280 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012)); VAWA 2013, § 904, 127 Stat. at
123 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(f) (2012)).
10. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (2012).
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Rights. On closer examination, however, these new procedural
requirements contain some significant departures from what the
Constitution requires in state and federal court. This includes a more robust
right to appointed counsel and different jury composition rights.11 The focus
of this article is ICRA’s new requirement that tribes provide criminal
defendants with the right to effective assistance of counsel whenever a tribe
is exercising TLOA enhanced sentencing authority or VAWA 2013
jurisdiction. Tribal court defendants have had an explicit federal statutory
right to assistance of counsel since 1968 when Congress enacted ICRA. 12
But prior to the TLOA of 2010 and VAWA 2013 amendments, ICRA did
not require tribes to provide indigents with appointed counsel or provide
tribal court defendants with the right to effective assistance of counsel. 13
Not only does ICRA now require tribes to ensure defendants subject to
TLOA’s enhanced sentencing and VAWA 2013 expanded jurisdiction
provisions have the right to effective assistance of counsel, but it also
explicitly tethers the substance of that right to the federal constitutional
ineffective assistance of counsel standard.14 This article analyzes this new
federal statutory right to effective assistance of counsel commensurate with
the U.S. Constitution in tribal court proceedings and explores how that right
will be defined and enforced.
11. I have explored some of these points in earlier articles – VAWA 2013’S Right to
Appointed Counsel in Tribal Court Proceedings – A Rising Tide That Lifts All Boats or a
Procedural Windfall for Non-Indian Defendants?, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 379 (2016), and
Let the Jury Fit the Crime: Increasing Native American Jury Pool Representation in Federal
Judicial Districts with Indian Country Criminal Jurisdiction, 77 MONT. L. REV. 281 (2016).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1) (2012).
13. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (ICRA’s 1968 default provision applicable to nonTLOA and non-VAWA cases, providing that “[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of selfgovernment shall . . . deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right . . . at his own
expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense (except as provided in subsection
(b)) [sic “c”]” with 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(c)(2) and 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(2). Tribes, of course,
can and do ensure that defendants receive effective assistance of counsel under tribal law
and practice. Further, some tribes have a long history of providing or allowing lay advocates
to assist litigants, a practice that dates back to a period in which federal law prohibited
licensed attorneys from appearing in tribal court. See infra Section II.A.1. Tribal court
criminal defendants, however, did not have a federal statutory right to effective assistance of
counsel until Congress provided for it in the Tribal Law and Order Act in 2010. See Tribal
Law and Order Act of 2010, tit. II, § 234(c), 124 Stat. at 2280 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
1302(c) (2012)).
14. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1) (2012) (requiring tribes to “provide” criminal defendants
subject to the TLOA and VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA with “effective assistance of
counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution”).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss1/1

No. 1]

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER ICRA

5

The Supreme Court defined the federal constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel for state and federal courts over thirty years ago in
Strickland v. Washington.15 Strickland’s parameters have been fleshed out
almost exclusively through federal court habeas review of state court
convictions.16 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought by state
court prisoners in federal court are subject to two layers of deference. The
first is required by title 28, the federal habeas corpus statute authorizing
federal court review of state court conviction.17 Title 28 limits federal court
jurisdiction over state prisoner claims to challenges brought under federal
law and precludes federal court review of any state prisoner claim that was
not first presented to the state courts.18 And, importantly, Title 28 further
requires federal courts to extend considerable deference to previous
determinations made by state courts in resolving state prisoners’ claims.19
The second layer of deference is built into Strickland’s two-pronged
ineffective assistance of counsel test, which requires courts to determine (1)
whether counsel’s performance was deficient and, if so, (2) whether
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.20 Whether
counsel’s performance was deficient turns on whether her conduct and
choices were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.21 Under
Strickland, this “objectively reasonable” inquiry requires almost complete
deference to any choice by counsel that can fairly be characterized as
tactical or strategic.22 The result is that federal courts considering state
prisoner Strickland claims under Title 28 must employ a “double
deference” review.23
Like state prisoners, tribal prisoners can seek post-conviction review of
their convictions in federal court through habeas corpus petitions. As noted,
15. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
16. As discussed, infra, this dynamic is a function of the nature of the claim and the
respective number of prosecutions brought in state and federal court. Reviewing courts
(whether state or federal) rarely entertain ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct
appeal because resolution of those claims almost always requires development of facts
outside the trial court record. The vast majority of criminal prosecutions in the U.S. occur at
the state, not the federal, level. As a result, most prisoners in the United States are
incarcerated by the states, not the federal government.
17. 28 U.S.C § 2254 (2012).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 2254(e)(1).
20. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
21. Id. at 688.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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there was no explicit federal statutory right to effective assistance of
counsel in tribal court before TLOA was enacted. TLOA imported
Strickland’s constitutional effective assistance of counsel standard into
ICRA.24 In doing so, tribal court convictions were made subject to Sixth
Amendment-style ineffective assistance of counsel challenges in federal
court through habeas review.25 Although tribal prisoners, like state
prisoners, have a statutory right to federal post-conviction review through a
writ of habeas corpus, the law governing petitions brought by tribal
prisoners is very different from that governing petitions brought by state
prisoners. Tribal prisoner petitions are authorized under ICRA, not Title 28,
the federal habeas corpus statute.26 As habeas review of tribal convictions is
authorized by a different statute and informed by a different history, federal
review of tribal convictions has a separate and unique federal jurisprudence.
Further, compared to Title 28’s detailed statutory scheme governing federal
habeas review of state prisoners’ claims, ICRA’s habeas provision is
startlingly bare-boned. It consists of a single sentence and it contains none
of the procedural or substantive barriers to federal court review of state
court convictions found in Title 28.27
It is this habeas filter, or more specifically the level of deference federal
courts must extend to the dispositions of state and tribal courts, that
delineates when the denial of a federal right by states or tribes is federally
intolerable. This article explores questions that will likely arise when
federal courts encounter tribal prisoners’ ineffective assistance of counsel
claims now that they are explicitly cognizable in federal habeas review.
Specifically, it asks whether federal courts will subject tribal prisoner
ineffective assistance of counsel claims to the same double deference
review they are required to apply to state prisoner Strickland claims, or
whether federal courts will be more solicitous of tribal prisoners’
ineffective assistance of counsel claims now that non-Indians are subject to
prosecution in tribal court under VAWA 2013.
24. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
25. As discussed, infra, before the Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel into the Fourteenth Amendment and extended Sixth Amendment protections
to the states, state court right to counsel violations were cognizable as Fourteenth
Amendment due process deprivations. The significance of linking ICRA’s right to effective
assistance of counsel to Strickland’s Sixth Amendment standard is that tribal prisoners’
claims would now appear to be governed exclusively by the Sixth Amendment standard as
articulated in Strickland, and not subject to any due process analysis.
26. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2012)).
27. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
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Part I of this article is a history and analysis of the federal constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel. It explains how federal ineffective
assistance of counsel jurisprudence has developed almost exclusively in the
context of federal habeas review of state court convictions and rendered
most federal ineffective assistance of counsel claims unviable. Part II
explains the right to counsel in tribal court and the habeas corpus remedy
available to tribal prisoners under ICRA. Part III identifies issues that will
need to be addressed now that Congress has created a statutory ineffective
assistance of counsel claim for tribal prisoners tied to the federal
constitutional standard and subject to federal habeas review under ICRA. I
conclude that by creating a right to effective assistance of counsel for
TLOA and VAWA 2013 tribal court defendants and specifying that it must
be “at least equal to that guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution,” Congress has
unequivocally bound federal court habeas review of tribal prisoners’
ineffective assistance of counsel claims to the Strickland analysis.28 That
change, I submit, will make most tribal prisoner ineffective assistance of
counsel claims a foregone conclusion, as is the case for Strickland claims
brought by state prisoners in federal habeas review. To resolve any
ambiguities on this point, I propose that Congress take the next logical step
and require federal courts to extend tribal court dispositions of tribal
prisoners’ claims the same high level of deference federal courts are
currently required to extend to state court determinations on habeas review.
Absent this safeguard, ICRA’s new right to effective assistance of counsel
can easily and unwittingly become a vehicle for unwarranted heightened
scrutiny and micromanagement of tribal court proceedings by federal
courts.
I. Constitutional Regulation of Defense Counsel in State and Federal Court
A. An Evolving Standard – From Due Process “Farce and Mockery” to
Sixth Amendment Effectiveness
The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to assistance
of counsel29 and protects from deprivations of life, liberty, and property
28. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(c)(1) (2012).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].”). The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel guarantee, like other parts of the Bill of Rights, was not understood to
extend to the states until the Court incorporated it into the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court first recognized the right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment as a
fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
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without due process of law.30 The Constitution says nothing about the
quality of the assistance of counsel to which criminal defendants are
entitled or about the role of defense counsel in guarding against
deprivations of due process in criminal prosecutions. Federal courts,
however, have long held that the Constitution requires more than just a
“warm body” to accompany a criminal defendant to court.31 Rather, it
requires that criminal defendants receive some level of competent
assistance to protect their rights.32
Under contemporary jurisprudence, a criminal defendant’s right to
effective assistance of counsel is understood to derive from the Sixth

U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon, of course, held that the Constitution requires appointment of
counsel at public expense for indigent defendants charged with serious offenses. Id. at 339.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (applying the same
prohibition to the states).
31. Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New
Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 16 (1986) (“Where the right to counsel
existed . . . it clearly included more than the privilege of having a warm body at one’s side.
Early cases . . . noted the imperative of making an ‘effective’ rather than merely ‘formal’
appointment.”) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (“The record indicates
that the appearance [of counsel] was rather pro forma than zealous and active . . . . Under the
circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in
any substantial sense.”); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (“The Constitution’s
guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment.”)).
32. Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)). Defense counsel
technically is not a state actor, particularly if counsel is retained and not appointed by the
court. But because courts historically linked the right to competent counsel to a defendant’s
due process right to a fair trial, something courts and prosecutors (who are state actors) are
bound to protect, the Court has rejected the notion that there is any constitutional
significance between retained and appointed counsel in regulating defense counsel conduct.
See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344-45 (“A proper respect for the Sixth Amendment disarms [the]
contention that defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less protection than
defendants for whom the State appoints counsel . . . . The vital guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment would stand for little if the often uninformed decision to retain a particular
lawyer could reduce or forfeit the defendant’s entitlement to constitutional protection. Since
the State’s conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the State in the defendant’s
conviction, we see no basis for drawing a distinction between retained and appointed counsel
that would deny equal justice to defendants who must choose their own lawyers.”). This is
consistent with the Court’s application of constitutional jury selection jurisprudence to
defense counsel—although defense counsel is not a state actor, she is nonetheless subject to
regulation in jury selection practice under the Batson line of cases. See Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
(state action requirement for Batson Equal Protection claim can be based in judicial system’s
close supervision of jury selection).
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Amendment right to assistance of counsel clause.33 It is a right that the
Court has extended to state court defendants by incorporation into the
Fourteenth Amendment.34 Earlier, however, federal courts identified due
process guarantees, not the Sixth Amendment, as the constitutional basis for
regulating defense counsel’s performance in both state and federal
prosecutions.35 Federal courts’ due process inquiry into defense counsel’s
performance was extremely deferential, denying relief unless the
defendant’s trial resulted in a “farce and mockery” of justice.36
It is difficult to pinpoint just when the center of gravity of the
constitutional standard for defense counsel performance shifted from due
process to the Sixth Amendment. The farce and mockery standard was the
prevailing test in federal courts in 1970, when the Supreme Court decided
McMann v. Richardson.37 In McMann, the Court explicitly recognized that
the constitutional “right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.”38 This passage is frequently cited, including recently by the
Supreme Court, for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment assistance of
counsel guarantee encompasses the right to effective assistance of
counsel.39 But whether the right to counsel encompasses some basic level of
competence was not at issue in McMann, nor did it link this right to the
Sixth Amendment, making this observation read more like an off-handed
reference to a long-standing obvious truth rather than a holding.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Even before the Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel guarantee into the Fourteenth Amendment, state court defendants were
understood to have a federal due process right to meaningful assistance of counsel under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (“The effective
assistance of counsel in such a case is a constitutional requirement of due process which no
member of the Union may disregard.”); see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70
(1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
35. See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 668-69 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
889 (1945) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee effective counsel, and
that the defendant’s only source for relief is the due process fair trial guarantee).
36. Id.; see Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1983). The Diggs court
stated that a due process claim would only lie “where the circumstances surrounding the trial
shocked the conscience of the court and made the proceedings a farce and a mockery of
justice.” Diggs, 148 F.2d at 670.
37. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
38. Id. at 771 n.14 (emphasis added).
39. In the recent case of Buck v. Davis, for example, the Court stated: “The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel ‘is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’” 137 S. Ct.
759, 775 (2017) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting in
turn McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14)).
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McMann involved a guilty plea. It cites Gideon v. Wainwright, a case
brought up on a state habeas petition seven years earlier and decided
squarely under the Sixth Amendment, for the proposition that a “defendant
pleading guilty to a felony charge has a federal right to the assistance of
counsel.”40 However, the authorities the McMann Court cites in support of
its statement that defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel
are due process, rather than Sixth Amendment, cases.41 Thus, although the
proposition that the Sixth Amendment “assistance of counsel” guarantee
requires some basic level of competence is accepted wisdom, it appears that
the Court has never squarely addressed this precise issue under the Sixth
Amendment. It certainly did not address it as a Sixth Amendment issue in
McMann, because the source of the right simply was not at issue there. 42
Nor did the McMann Court address the standard by which federal courts
should evaluate whether defense counsel had rendered constitutionally
deficient assistance. In fact, it explicitly demurred on this issue.43
In Strickland, decided in 1984, the Court unequivocally grounded the
constitutional inquiry into the quality of defense counsel’s performance in
the Sixth Amendment.44 It also picked up the question the McMann Court
left unanswered: what is the constitutional standard for resolving a Sixth
Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel?45 Before Strickland,
lower courts struggled to discern the Court’s authority for the federal
constitutional effective assistance of counsel guarantee and to articulate the
standard by which federal courts were to evaluate claims of defense counsel
40. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14.
41. See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 57 (1932).
42. McMann, 397 U.S. at 770-71. Similarly, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court said that
“[a] guilty plea is open to attack on the ground that counsel did not provide defendant with
‘reasonably competent advice.’” 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); see also Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (holding a defendant may attack a plea by showing that counsel’s
advice did not meet the McMann standards).
43. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 (“On the one hand, uncertainty is inherent in predicting
court decisions; but on the other hand defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the
effective assistance of competent counsel. Beyond this we think the matter, for the most part,
should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition that if
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot
be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that judges should strive to maintain
proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal
cases in their courts.”).
44. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-86.
45. Id. at 687-88.
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incompetence.46 Trapnell v. United States,47 decided a year before
Strickland in 1983, is a good example of how the lower federal courts
resolved these issues in the void created by the Court’s silence on this point.
In Trapnell, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded,
notwithstanding the lack of direct authority from the Supreme Court, that
the focus for questions concerning defense counsel competence had shifted
from due process to the Sixth Amendment.48 This shift, the Second Circuit
concluded, required it to abandon the due process “farce and mockery”
standard and adopt a reasonable competence standard, which it concluded
better aligned with the Supreme Court’s post-Gideon Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.49

46. Berger, supra note 31, at 67-68 (“In contrast to the Supreme Court, which had said
little or nothing of help in defining a constitutional floor for attorney conduct—in terms of
either specific representational tasks or an overall level of tolerable performance—the lower
courts, both federal and state, had had to deal with the gamut of incompetence claims and
thus been forced to articulate standards for judging these multifold client complaints. Under
traditional tests of competence, only the most egregious errors by defense counsel could
provide the basis for upsetting a conviction. . . . After-the-fact constitutional appraisal of
attorney conduct rested solely on the vague, residual due process right to a fair trial. A
defendant challenging counsel’s performance could prevail only if the representation had
been so shoddy as to constitute a ‘farce and a mockery of justice,’ a miscarriage so blatant
that the judge and the prosecutor had a duty to observe and correct it.”) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945)).
47. 725 F.2d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 1983).
48. Id. at 154-55 (“[A]lthough the Court has never directly addressed the question of
whether ‘reasonably competent assistance’ at trial is constitutionally required, both the
holding in [Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)] and the dictum in [Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982)] clearly suggest that this standard is consistent with, and
may in fact be required by, the Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.”).
49. Id. at 155. In Trapnell, the court noted that the farce and mockery standard “first
formulated eighteen years before Gideon[] was based on the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.” Id. at 154. The Sixth Amendment, further, was viewed narrowly by the court
that first adopted the farce and mockery standard and had been interpreted to be “concerned
only with assuring the presence of counsel, leaving the performance of counsel to be tested
against the more general ‘fair trial’ standard of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.”
Id. (citing Diggs, 148 F.2d at 668-69). “More recently,” the court continued, “the Sixth
Amendment has become the source not only of the right to counsel but also of the standard
to be used in determining whether the assistance of counsel is ‘effective.’” Id. (citing United
States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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B. Strickland v. Washington – The Court Settles on a Sixth Amendment
Standard
In 1984, fourteen years after the Court in McMann said that the right to
assistance of counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel
and asserted that courts have an affirmative obligation to police this right, it
decided Strickland v. Washington.50 Strickland involved a federal postconviction challenge to a state death sentence based on defense counsel’s
failure to adequately investigate and develop mitigating evidence that might
have spared his client the death penalty.51 In Strickland, the Court
considered the question it declined to address in McMann—what standard
federal courts should use to evaluate claims of a denial of assistance of
counsel based on defense counsel incompetence.52 Now over thirty years
old, the Strickland standard continues to govern federal constitutional
ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought by state and federal
petitioners.
In 1976, David Washington and two accomplices went on a ten-day
crime spree in Florida that included three stabbing murders, torture,
kidnapping, assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft.53
Washington confessed to his involvement and pleaded guilty to multiple
offenses, including three capital murder charges.54 At his plea colloquy,
Washington told the trial court that at the time of the crimes he was under
extreme stress because he was unable to support his family.55 The trial
judge told Washington that he had “a great deal of respect for people who
are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility.”56 As part of the
50. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
51. Id. at 678. Washington raised numerous issues in the lower state and federal courts.
Id. By the time he got to the Supreme Court, however, this was the focus of his challenge.
Id.
52. Id. at 683 (“The petition presents a type of Sixth Amendment claim that this Court
has not previously considered in any generality. The Court has considered Sixth Amendment
claims based on actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether, as well
as claims based on state interference with the ability of counsel to render effective assistance
to the accused. With the exception of Cuyler v. Sullivan, however, which involved a claim
that counsel’s assistance was rendered ineffective by a conflict of interest, the Court has
never directly and fully addressed a claim of ‘actual ineffectiveness’ . . . .”). (citing United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1976)) (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 671-72.
54. Id. at 672.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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sentencing investigation, defense counsel interviewed Washington about his
background, and spoke with Washington’s wife and mother.57 Counsel did
not seek character witnesses for Washington or obtain a psychiatric
examination.58 Based on counsel’s judgment, he considered Washington’s
best chance to avoid the death penalty to be appealing to the trial court,
who believed it was important for defendants to accept responsibility for
their crimes, rather than argue for mitigation.59 Counsel forewent a
psychiatric examination to prevent the prosecution from cross-examining
Washington or from introducing its own psychiatric evaluation.60 In
addition, counsel did not request a presentence report because it would have
undermined Washington’s claim that he had no significant criminal
record.61 Following a hearing at which defense counsel presented no
mitigating evidence, the trial judge sentenced Washington to death on the
three capital murder counts and prison time for the other offenses.62 The
Florida Supreme Court affirmed Washington’s convictions and sentence.63
He then sought post-conviction relief in state court arguing that he had been
denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing.64 The trial
court denied Washington’s petition for post-conviction relief and the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed that denial.65
Washington filed a federal habeas petition forwarding a number of
claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel.66 The federal district
court denied relief.67 It concluded that although trial counsel failed to
adequately investigate evidence of mitigation, Washington had not been
prejudiced by counsel’s decision.68 The court of appeals69 reversed the
district court and remanded for further proceedings.70 Florida obtained en
57. Id. at 672-73.
58. Id. at 673.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 675.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 675, 678.
67. Id. at 679.
68. Id. at 678-89.
69. While Washington’s appeal was pending, Congress split the Fifth Circuit and
created the new Eleventh Circuit; the panel decision in his case was issued by the Fifth
Circuit, but his en banc petition was heard by the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 679.
70. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1250 (5th Cir. 1982) (Vance, J.). On the
issue of trial counsel’s competence, the majority of the panel remanded Washington’s
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banc review.71 The en banc court reversed the panel, rejected the panel’s
ineffective assistance of counsel standard, and set out a different standard to
govern Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the
newly created Eleventh Circuit.72 The en banc court remanded
Washington’s petition to the district court with directions to apply this
standard to his claim.73
As discussed, the Supreme Court had recognized in McMann (but not
directly held) that effective assistance of counsel is part of the assistance of
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and held in Gideon that the
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel is incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment.74 As demonstrated by the inconsistent disposition
of Washington’s claim at the federal level, there was considerable
disagreement among the lower courts about the proper standard for
evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Strickland to address this unsettled area of law.75
petition with instructions to the district court to determine whether Washington’s trial
counsel was ineffective, without regard to the prejudicial effect of counsel’s errors. If the
district court found counsel was ineffective, it was instructed to grant Washington relief if he
showed that but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, the state court proceedings (but not
necessarily the outcome of the proceedings, i.e., the death sentence) “would have been
altered in a way helpful to [Washington].” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
71. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 679.
72. Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1250 (Vance, J.). The en banc court adopted the following
standard:
We determine that under some circumstances when a strategic choice by
counsel makes unnecessary a certain line of investigation, it is not required that
effective counsel pursue that investigation. We also determine that a habeas
petitioner must show that his counsel’s ineffectiveness caused “actual and
substantial disadvantage” to the conduct of his defense.
Id.
73. Id.
74. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85, 687.
75. See id. at 671 (“This case requires us to consider the proper standards for judging a
criminal defendant’s contention that the Constitution requires a conviction or death sentence
to be set aside because counsel’s assistance at the trial or sentencing was ineffective.”); id. at
683-84 (“In assessing attorney performance, all the Federal Courts of Appeals and all but a
few state courts have now adopted the ‘reasonably effective assistance’ standard in one
formulation or another. Yet this Court has not had occasion squarely to decide whether that
is the proper standard. With respect to the prejudice that a defendant must show from
deficient attorney performance, the lower courts have adopted tests that purport to differ in
more than formulation. In particular, the Court of Appeals in this case . . . adopted . . . a
standard that requires a showing that specified deficient conduct of counsel was likely to
have affected the outcome of the proceeding. For these reasons, we granted certiorari to
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How the Strickland Court characterizes the role of counsel and the
purpose of the Sixth Amendment is key to understanding the standard it
settled on. First, it identified the purpose of the right to counsel as necessary
to protecting the “fundamental right to a fair trial.”76 It even went a step
further by defining a “fair trial” as one in which “evidence subject to
adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of
issues defined in advance of the proceeding.”77 Second, it characterized the
role of counsel as “ensur[ing] that the adversarial testing process works to
produce a just result under the standards governing decision.”78 To show a
denial of a right to counsel under this construct requires showing “that the
conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.”79 On this platform, the Court
constructed a two-part standard a petitioner80 must meet to show he was
deprived of his federal right to counsel based on a claim of
consider the standards by which to judge a contention that the Constitution requires that a
criminal judgment be overturned because of the actual ineffective assistance of counsel.”)
(citations omitted). In framing the issue, the Court distinguished between trials and death
penalty sentencing proceedings, on one hand, and non-capital sentencing proceedings, on the
other, and specifically declined to address the standard for defense counsel outside the trial
and death penalty context. Id. at 686-87 (“The same principle applies to a capital sentencing
proceeding such as that provided by Florida law. We need not consider the role of counsel in
an ordinary sentencing, which may involve informal proceedings and standardless discretion
in the sentencer, and hence may require a different approach to the definition of
constitutionally effective assistance. A capital sentencing proceeding like the one involved in
this case, however, is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of
standards for decision, that counsel’s role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel’s role
at trial—to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under
the standards governing decision. For purposes of describing counsel’s duties, therefore,
Florida’s capital sentencing proceeding need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial.”)
(citations omitted).
76. Id. at 684.
77. Id. at 685.
78. Id. at 687; see also id. at 690 (“In making [a] determination [about counsel’s
effectiveness], the court should keep in mind that counsel’s function, as elaborated in
prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the
particular case.”).
79. Id.
80. A Strickland claim can be raised by a defendant/appellant on direct review, or by a
petitioner on collateral review. For clarity, I have attempted to use the term “petitioner”
throughout to designate the criminal defense client who is alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel at either juncture. I also use the term “prisoner” to designate an individual seeking
habeas corpus relief, which reflects the requirement that a habeas petitioner be in custody to
seek relief. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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ineffectiveness.81 First, the petitioner needs to show that his attorney’s
performance was deficient.82 Second, the petitioner must show counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced him.83
1. Strickland Deficient Performance
Deficient performance under Strickland means counsel’s errors were “so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by
the Sixth Amendment.”84 To evaluate counsel’s performance, Strickland
asks whether counsel’s conduct fell “below an objective standard of
reasonableness”85 as measured against the prevailing practice in the
81. Most states have adopted the Strickland standard to evaluate ineffective assistance
of counsel claims brought under their respective state constitutions. Gregory J. Sarno,
Annotation, Modern Status of Rules and Standards in State Courts as to Adequacy of
Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal Client, 2 A.L.R. 4th 27 (1980). Strickland,
therefore, has become the coin of the realm for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel
claims under both state and federal constitutions. States, of course, can and do offer
defendants broader remedies to address defense counsel incompetence under their own laws
and constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Aplaca, 837 P.2d 1298, 1305 (Haw. 1992) (holding that
a defendant raising ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Hawaii State Constitution
has burden of establishing 1) specific errors or omissions occurred reflecting counsel’s lack
of skill, judgment, or diligence, and 2) the errors or omissions resulted in either the
withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense); id. at 1305 n.2
(“[T]he test for measuring ineffective assistance of counsel [under the state constitution] . . .
differs from the federal standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington. Because the Strickland test has been criticized as being unduly difficult for a
defendant to meet, we continue to follow [this] standard . . . under Hawaii’s Constitution,
defendants are clearly afforded greater protection of their right to effective assistance of
counsel.”); see also Jan Lucas, A Cumulative Approach to Ineffective Assistance: New
York’s Requirement That Counsel’s Cumulative Efforts Amount to Meaningful
Representation: Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division, Second Department, 28
TOURO L. REV. 1073, 1083-86 (2012) (stating that New York, Alaska, Oregon, Hawaii, and
Massachusetts have adopted an ineffective assistance of counsel standard with a prejudice
requirement that is easier to meet than Strickland).
82. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 688. Before Strickland, lower courts were using different standards to
determine whether defense counsel’s performance had deprived the client of constitutionally
effective assistance of counsel, including the extremely forgiving “farce-and-mockery”
standard and different versions of a “reasonable competence” standard. Id. at 714 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). It is a fair question, however, whether there was an appreciable difference in
the results obtained under the different standards. Id. at 697; cf. Trapnell v. United States,
725 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that in several years of applying “farce and
mockery” standard along with “reasonable competence” standard, court “never found that
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community.86 Cognizant that constitutionalizing a professional performance
standard meant it was placing defense counsel conduct under judicial
scrutiny, the Court also mandated that reviewing courts extend defense
counsel decisions “wide latitude” to make reasonable “tactical decisions.”87
Otherwise, the specter of reviewing courts later labeling defense counsel
conduct as ineffective in hindsight would “distract counsel from the
overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause.”88
To address this concern, Strickland’s deficient performance standard
distinguishes between strategic or tactical decisions, on one hand, and nonstrategic choices, on the other.89 Where an attorney’s strategic decision or
choice is at issue on review, courts are required to extend deference to that
choice and will treat it as presumptively competent.90 In this way, the
Strickland test itself insulates most attorney decisions from judicial review
by cloaking them with a presumption of reasonableness if those decisions
the result of a case hinged on the choice of a particular standard”); see also Berger, supra
note 31, at 67-71. “[I]t is doubtful that semantic substitution of the ‘reasonable’ lawyer for
the lawyer who barely managed to avoid reducing the trial to a farce and mockery
accomplished very much in the way of practical reform.” Id. at 70.
86. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Although the Rules of Professional Conduct may
inform analysis of post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claims, they are not
dispositive, or even binding. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
11.10(b) (4th ed. 2015) (“In Nix v. Whiteside, the Court reaffirmed that what constitutes
reasonably effective assistance is not necessarily controlled by standard patterns of practice.
The Court there acknowledged that an attorney's performance could conceivably meet the
reasonably competent attorney standard even where the attorney breached an ‘ethical
standard of professional responsibility.’” (footnotes omitted)); United States v. Nickerson,
556 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e hold that an attorney's violation of a rule of
ethics or professional conduct before trial does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of
counsel.”).
87. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (concluding that harsh scrutiny “would encourage the
proliferation of ineffective [assistance claims]” and “dampen the ardor and impair the
independence of defense counsel”).
88. Id. at 689.
89. An example of a strategic choice might be the decision not to call a witness or cross
examine a government witness at trial. United States v. Miller, 643 F.2d 713, 714 (10th Cir.
1981) (“Whether to call a particular witness is a tactical decision and, thus, a ‘matter of
discretion’ for trial counsel.”) (quoting United States v. Dingle, 546 F.2d 1378, 1385 (10th
Cir. 1976)); see, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 787 F.2d 1429, 1432-33 (10th Cir. 1986)
(stating that the decision not to cross examine a government witness at trial is a strategic
choice); see also United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 644 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating that the
selection of questions is a matter of “strategic choice”). Non-strategic choices would include
conduct that breaches the fiduciary duty to the client, such as an unwaived or undisclosed
conflict of interest. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
90. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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are classified as strategic or tactical in nature. As a practical matter, this
deferential standard makes any attorney decision that can be labeled
strategic or tactical virtually unreviewable.91
Applying the test to Washington’s case, the Court concluded that counsel
did not perform deficiently and that Washington was not prejudiced.92
Counsel’s decision to forgo developing mitigating evidence, the Court
found, was a reasonable strategic decision in light of the seriousness of
Washington’s crimes, counsel’s conversations with Washington, and
counsel’s judgment that the trial court would look more favorably on
Washington at sentencing if Washington expressed remorse and took
responsibility for his actions.93 In light of these factors, the majority found
no reasonable probability that the trial court would have sentenced
Washington to life in prison instead of death.94 Washington, therefore, was
denied relief from his death sentence without further review.95
In dissent, Justice Marshall (presciently) objected that the majority’s
performance standard was “so malleable that, in practice, it [would] either
have no grip at all or [would] yield excessive variation in the manner in
which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different
courts.”96 Justice Marshall also challenged the notion that defense counsel
was entitled to the wide latitude granted by the Court’s standard. Much of
criminal counsel’s work, he argued, such as trial preparation, seeking bail,
consulting with the client, making objections and filing a notice of appeal
“could profitably be made the subject of uniform standards.”97
Like any standard focused on reasonableness-under-the-circumstances,
as opposed to a bright-line test, the Strickland inquiry is necessarily fact91. There are good reasons for this standard, as explained in Strickland. It prevents
reviewing courts from micro-managing lawyer conduct in hindsight and it avoids
constitutionalizing a code of professional conduct. On the other hand, of course, a highly
deferential standard insulates bad lawyering from redress by clients and courts even where,
as in Washington’s case, a prisoner’s life hangs in the balance.
92. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
93. Id. at 698-700.
94. Id. at 700.
95. Id. at 700-01.
96. Id. at 707-08. What, Justice Marshall asked, does “reasonable” mean? Is defense
counsel’s performance judged by reference to a reasonable paid attorney or a reasonable
appointed one? See id. at 708 (“[A] person of means, by selecting a lawyer and paying him
enough to ensure he prepares thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation than that
available to an indigent defendant, who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has
limited time and resources to devote to a given case.”).
97. Id. at 709.
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specific. This makes it hard to generalize about what lawyer missteps will
be considered constitutionally deficient on review. In Strickland, the Court
did identify some basic professional duties any lawyer owes his client, such
as providing assistance and undivided loyalty.98 In a criminal case, the
Court added, counsel is required to advocate for the defendant’s interest,
consult with him, and keep him informed of important developments in his
case.99 But the Court specifically declined to create a “checklist” for
evaluating counsel’s performance because of the complexity and variety of
issues that will confront defense counsel and the fact that there is a “range
of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant.”100 Further, since it is a two-part conjunctive test that places the
burden on the petitioner, courts can dispose of the claim by way of
whichever prong is easier to resolve, which the Supreme Court invited
lower courts to do.101 This has led to a lack of development of the law on
the Strickland performance prong.102
2. Strickland Prejudice
In addition to establishing counsel’s deficient performance, Strickland
requires a petitioner to show that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced him. Under Strickland, prejudice is measured by whether, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, “there is a reasonable probability
that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.”103 Under
this standard, “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.”104 Strickland is a “totality of the
98. Id. at 688.
99. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986) (identifying a duty to
conduct a reasonable investigation in criminal cases) (“Because that testing process
generally will not function properly unless defense counsel has done some investigation into
the prosecution’s case and into various defense strategies, we noted that ‘counsel has a duty
to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.’”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).
100. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.
101. Id. at 670 (“A court need not first determine whether counsel’s performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed.”).
102. Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 711 (2011) (“If
courts never get to the attorney error analysis, then constitutional norms of unacceptable
attorney practice will not develop.”).
103. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
104. Id.; see id. at 714 (explaining that before Strickland, lower courts developed and
adopted a variety of approaches for determining the level of prejudice required to receive a
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evidence” standard and it incorporates presumptions against which defense
counsel’s performance will be measured, including a presumption that the
proceedings were conducted with regularity and fairness.105
As noted, Sixth Amendment jurisprudence distinguishes between two
broad categories of right to counsel violations—one where the denial results
from state action (by the trial court or the prosecution), the other where the
denial results from the conduct of defense counsel. For violations in the
first category, such as when the state either actually or constructively denies
a defendant assistance of counsel or interferes with counsel’s assistance,
prejudice will be presumed.106 Like the clear error standard of review, the
Court has reasoned that prejudice under these circumstances is “so likely
that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.”107
Furthermore, because these violations are easy to identify and the state is
responsible for them, they are denials that are “easy for the government to
prevent.”108
In the other category, deprivations of the Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel caused by counsel’s performance (Strickland’s
concern), the Court has identified limited instances in which prejudice will
be presumed. This includes representation by a defense counsel with an
actual conflict of interest.109 But even where defense counsel has a conflict

new trial or new sentencing hearing, ranging from a demanding “outcome-determinative”
test to an automatic reversal role regardless of injury). Strickland struck a balance by
adopting a prejudice standard that is less demanding than the outcome-determinative test,
but that still imposes a high bar for petitioners. Id. at 697. (“With regard to the prejudice
inquiry, only the strict outcome-determinative test, among the standards articulated in the
lower courts, imposes a heavier burden on defendants than the tests laid down today.”).
105. Id. at 694-95 (“In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in
the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on grounds
of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to law. An assessment of
the likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant must exclude the possibility of
arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, ‘nullification,’ and the like.”).
106. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
107. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980)) (“In Cuyler v. Sullivan,
the Court held that prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of
interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic
of counsel’s duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of
representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid
conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations
likely to give rise to conflicts, it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a
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of interest, the Court has not adopted a per se rule as it has done for the
other category of right to counsel violations. Rather, the Court has adopted
a “more limited . . . presumption of prejudice” under which prejudice is
presumed only if counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and
“an actual conflict of interest adversely affected [the] lawyer's
performance.”110 Other than conflicts of interest meeting this standard, a
court will presume prejudice only where defense counsel’s failure to subject
a case to adversarial scrutiny is “entire.”111 These circumstances aside,
claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to the
general requirement that the petitioner affirmatively prove prejudice.112
The Strickland prejudice prong requires a showing that the “result” of
the proceeding would have been different. But Strickland is not entirely
clear or consistent in identifying what a petitioner must demonstrate would
have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance. There are two
possible questions that could be asked in this context: whether the ultimate
decision in the case (i.e., the verdict, plea, or sentence) was affected by
counsel’s errors, or, alternatively, whether counsel’s errors undermined the
procedural fairness by which the verdict or sentence was obtained.113 The
fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest.”) (citations omitted)); see
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c).
110. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Cuyler, 446 U. S. at 348-50 (footnote omitted).
111. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 (establishing the “Cronic presumed prejudice” rule). Cronic
was decided before Strickland, and the Court revisited the Cronic rule in Bell v. Cone, 535
U.S. 685 (2002). Although the Cronic rule remains intact, analysts disagree on Bell’s impact
on Cronic post-Strickland. See Justin Rand, Comment, Pro Se Paternalism: The
Contractual, Practical, and Behavioral Cases for Automatic Reversal, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
283, 291-92 (2014) (stating that Bell was significant because it clarified prejudice will only
be presumed in the three circumstances outlined in Cronic and that all other cases will be
analyzed under Strickland’s prejudice standard); Jennifer Williams, Note, Criminal Law—
The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel—The Supreme Court Minimizes the Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel by Maximizing the Deference Awarded to Barely Competent
Defense Attorneys, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 149, 170 (2005) (stating that Bell was
intended to limit presumptions of prejudice to cases where defense counsel fails completely
to perform adversarial function challenge the prosecution).
112. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
113. The prejudice test adopted by the circuit court in Strickland, for example, required
the petitioner to show that defense counsel’s error “resulted in actual and substantial
disadvantage to the course of his defense.” Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1262. Under this test, if
petitioner made this showing, the burden then shifted to the prosecution to show that the
deficient performance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the entire record.
Id. at 1260-62; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 682. The Supreme Court crafted a
compromise based on the various standards then being used by federal circuit and state
supreme courts, with the main point of disagreement being what level of prejudice a
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first inquiry looks at whether the decision-maker reached a verdict or
sentence supported by the evidence; the second asks whether the verdict or
sentence was obtained in a fair manner. The Strickland majority clearly
identified the bottom-line outcome in that case as the fairness of
Washington’s death sentence (rather than the fairness of the proceeding). 114
But in reaching that point, it seems to conflate the two concepts. For
example, in providing guidance to the lower courts on application of the
standard, the Strickland majority adopted what looks like a harmless error
standard that evaluates the impact of an error on the verdict or decision at
issue in light of all the evidence of guilt in the record (or, in a death penalty
challenge, evidence of aggravation and mitigation).115 At the same time, the
petitioner needed to show and who would carry the burden. See JOHN M. BURKOFF & NANCY
M. BURKOFF, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL § 4:10 (2017 ed.). The Court rejected
burdens of proof that required too little—such as a test requiring only a showing of a
“conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding—or too much—such as requiring that
counsel’s error more likely than not impacted the outcome. Instead, the Court took a middle
ground requiring the defendant to “ show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
114. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698-99 (applying the standard to Washington’s case, the
Court analyzed the prejudice prong to require a showing that the decision-maker would have
reached a different conclusion on the evidence, i.e., the decision-maker would have
concluded that Washington should not have received a death sentence); id. at 695 (“When a
defendant challenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this case, the question is
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer--including an
appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence--would have concluded
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”). In
dissent, Justice Marshall disputed that it should be the defendant’s burden to show prejudice
from an allegedly incompetent attorney’s performance, and he challenged the notion that
prejudice should be measured solely with respect to the fairness of the outcome of the trial
without also considering the fairness of the procedure by which the outcome was obtained.
Id. at 711 (“The majority contends that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a
manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was represented by a
manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot agree.”).
115. Id. at 695-96. The majority’s approach, in the end, really is about the accuracy of the
guilt determination or appropriateness of the sentence, not the fairness of the process. Id. at
696 (“[A] court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of
showing that the decision reached [by the verdict] would reasonably likely have been
different absent the errors.”); see also JOSH BOWERS, ABA POLICY ON THE STRICKLAND
PREJUDICE PRONG 4 (n.d.), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative
/criminal_justice/ABApolicy_StricklandPrejudiceProng.authcheckdam.pdf. The Strickland
Court’s “focus was on the substantive outcome. In the Court’s estimation, an inaccurate
result was not an unjust result. In other words, a manifestly guilty defendant could have no
claim even if he were represented by manifestly incompetent counsel.” Id.
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Court emphasized that the focus of the inquiry in adjudicating a claim of
actual ineffectiveness of counsel must be “the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding whose result is being challenged.”116
These are more than semantic differences regarding the definition of
“result.” A test that asks only if the verdict or sentence is reliable because
the evidence supports a guilty finding or sentence will tolerate more
attorney errors because it denies relief to petitioners regardless of the
impact of counsel’s errors on the quality and quantity of evidence
considered by the decision-maker. In contrast, a test that looks to the
fairness of a proceeding in evaluating the reliability of a guilty verdict or
sentence will grant more relief to petitioners because it looks beyond the
quantum of evidence of petitioner’s guilt and concentrates on the fairness
with which the petitioner’s conviction or sentence was obtained.
C. Double Deference – The High Hurdle Faced by State Prisoners Seeking
Federal Review of Strickland Claims
The right to post conviction relief is grounded in the right to habeas
review found in the U.S. Constitution,117 and it traces its origins to the
Magna Carta.118 It encompasses the right of a prisoner to challenge the
legality of his detention pursuant to a criminal conviction through a
separate proceding against the person with the authority to detain him
(usually a prison warden).119 Congress first codified the writ for federal

116. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 (“[T]he principles we have stated do not establish
mechanical rules. Although those principles should guide the process of decision, the
ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result
is being challenged.”); see Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 331 (Pa. 1999) (“We
thus see in Strickland . . . a tension between two principles . . . . On the one hand, the United
States Supreme Court gives a clear standard for determining . . . ineffectiveness . . . ,
namely, where there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ . . . Yet at the same time [the
Strickland Court] . . . rejected as ‘not quite appropriate’ a prejudice test based on a
defendant's proving that ‘counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the
outcome in the case.’”).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”).
118. Magna Carta 1215, YALE L. SCH.: THE AVALON PROJECT, ¶ 39, http://avalon.law
.yale.edu/medieval/magframe.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) (“No freemen shall be taken or
imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send
upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”).
119. Id.
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prisoners in section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.120 In the Habeas
Corpus Act of Feb. 5, 1867,121 it authorized federal courts to hear habeas
petitions brought by state prisoners challenging the legality of their
detention under federal law.122
Congress and the Court have since developed a number of procedural
and substantive limitations on the Writ. Federal law, for example, has long
required state prisoners to exhaust all state court remedies before seeking
federal habeas relief by first presenting and litigating federal constitutional
claims in the state courts.123 In addition, a habeas petitioner must be in
custody to file a writ of habeas corpus.124 The “in custody” requirement
bars a habeas challenge to a conviction once a prisoner has served the

120. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
121. Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255).
122. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) (2012) (authorizing federal courts to issue habeas corpus writs
for “any person . . . restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any
treaty or law of the United States”); see also 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURIS. § 4261 (3d ed. 1998) (stating that in 1867
Congress made “habeas corpus from a federal court available to state prisoners. This is the
most important and most controversial use of habeas corpus[.]”) . As discussed infra, a
different federal statute, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), provides for federal
court habeas review of tribal court convictions.
123. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 122, § 4264 (“A state prisoner is ordinarily not able
to obtain habeas corpus from a federal court unless he has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the state. Although this principle was written into the Judicial Code in 1948,
it had been applied for many years before as a judge-made limit on the 1867 statute that
made habeas corpus generally available for state prisoners.”); see also Developments in the
Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1094 (1970) (“The significant
interests protected by the exhaustion requirement are of two types. First, exhaustion
preserves the role of the state courts in the application and enforcement of federal law. Early
federal intervention in state criminal proceedings would tend to remove federal questions
from the state courts, isolate those courts from constitutional issues, and thereby remove
their understanding of and hospitality to federally protected interests. Second, exhaustion
preserves orderly administration of state judicial business, preventing the interruption of
state adjudication by federal habeas proceedings. It is important that petitioners reach state
appellate courts, which can develop and correct errors of state and federal law and most
effectively supervise and impose uniformity on trial courts.”) (quoted with approval in
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973)).
124. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 122, § 4262 (“At common law the function of the
writ of habeas corpus . . . was to provide a judicial test of ‘the legality of the detention of one
in the custody of another . . . .’ Thus it is not surprising that the habeas corpus provision of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 used the words ‘in custody’ nor that the requirement that a
prisoner be ‘in custody’ is now stated in every section of the statute . . . .”).
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entirety of his sentence.125 In addition to procedural bars, some substantive
claims are not cognizable on habeas review. A claim based on an alleged
violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, for example, cannot be raised in a habeas corpus
petition, except as an underlying claim when a petitioner asserts counsel
was deficient in failing to litigate a Fourth Amendment issue.126
Congress undertook a major overhaul of federal habeas review with the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).127 One
of the outcomes of this overhaul was to limit the reach of the writ and
codify the process federal courts are required to follow in reviewing state
and federal prisoners’ habeas petitions.128 AEDPA changed federal habeas
125. Id. (“The kind of custody that will suffice is judged by a very liberal standard, and
any restraint on a petitioner’s liberty because of his conviction that is over and above what
the state imposes on the public generally will suffice.”); see also Hensley v. Municipal
Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (“[C]ustody requirement . . . designed to preserve the writ
of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty” because it is an
“extraordinary remedy whose use has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more
conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor
immediate.”); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963) (“History, usage, and
precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints
on a man’s liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought
sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus.”); Quair v.
Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 967-68 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that banishment imposed
against the tribal members constituted “detention” within the meaning of § 1303, ICRA’s
habeas corpus provision). But see Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1182-83 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that a state law requiring a sex offender to register is a collateral consequence
and not “custody”).
126. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (holding that a state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477
U.S. 365, 368, 375 (1986) (holding that restrictions on federal habeas review of Fourth
Amendment claims announced in Stone v. Powell do not extend to Sixth Amendment claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel where “the principal allegation and manifestation of
inadequate representation is counsel’s failure to file a timely motion to suppress evidence
allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment”) (“Where defense counsel's
failure to litigate Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of
ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been
different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.”).
127. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(2) (2012)). The Court upheld the constitutionality of the AEDPA in Felker v.
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
128. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 122, § 4261.1 (“Congress made many important
changes in habeas corpus in 1996 . . . . The changes made by the 1996 legislation are the end
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law by: (1) establishing a one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal
habeas petition,129 (2) authorizing federal courts to deny on the merits any
claim a petitioner failed to exhaust in state court,130 (3) prohibiting federal
courts from holding an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner failed to
develop facts in state court, except in limited circumstances,131 (4) barring
successive petitions, except in limited circumstances,132 and (5) imposing a
new standard of review for federal court evaluation of state court

product of decades of debate about habeas corpus and the drafting in the new statute has
been criticized. The changes restrict habeas corpus but they do not virtually eliminate it, as
some critics would have preferred.”).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012).
130. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 122, § 4261.1 (“The new statute preserves the
requirement of exhaustion of state remedies [contained in the earlier federal habeas statute],
but two significant innovations [were] . . . introduced. An application for a writ of habeas
corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust
the remedies available in the courts of the state. In addition, a state shall not be deemed to
have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement
unless the state, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.”); see also 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (explaining that petitioner can avoid exhaustion only if
there is no available state remedy or the remedy is ineffective to protect the petitioner’s
rights; if there is no state remedy because of a procedural default, federal review is still
prohibited); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (finding that because
exhaustion doctrine is designed to give state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve
federal constitutional claims before claims are presented to federal courts, “state prisoners
must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by
invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process”); McCool
v. New York State, 29 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Claims for ineffective
assistance of trial or appellate counsel raised in a petition brought pursuant to []§ 2254 are
subject to the exhaustion requirement if the state has provided a post-conviction remedy by
which the petitioner may present the claim independent of any reliance upon his appellate
counsel.”) (citing Caballero v. Keane, 42 F.3d 738, 740, 741 (2d Cir. 1994)).
131. AEDPA carried over a statutory presumption in the earlier version of the habeas
statute requiring federal courts to treat state court fact-findings as presumptively correct
unless rebutted by the petitioner by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1)(2012); see also Larry Yackle, Federal Evidentiary Hearings Under the New
Habeas Corpus Statute, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 135 (1996) (stating that to obtain an
evidentiary hearing, petitioner must show claim relies on a new rule made retroactive by the
Supreme Court, or that the factual predicate could not have been discovered earlier through
due diligence; in all cases, a petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that but
for the alleged error for which a hearing is sought, no reasonable factfinder would have
found petitioner guilty of the underlying offense).
132. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2012) (limiting the number of times a prisoner may ask for
a writ by requiring authorization of a three-judge panel to file a successive habeas petition).
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determinations of fact and applications of constitutional law.133 AEDPA
also requires a certificate of appealability from a court of review before a
petitioner may appeal from a district court’s denial of habeas relief.134
As noted, the federal constitutional right to counsel incorporates two
related, yet distinct, guarantees. The first implicates government action or
inaction.135 This guarantee incorporates the right to have the assistance of
counsel at all critical stages of a prosecution,136 the requirement that the
state appoint counsel to indigents at public expense before they can be
incarcerated,137 and the prohibition on state interference with defense
counsel’s ability to assist his client.138 The second guarantee is concerned
with defense counsel’s performance—the right to have effective assistance
of counsel.139 Judicial review of alleged right to counsel violations takes
different forms depending on the nature of the violation and the court in
which the violation originated. A defendant’s claim that he was deprived
entirely of assistance of counsel because a trial court failed to appoint
counsel at public expense or that a trial court interfered with a defendant’s
access to counsel are generally cognizable on direct review.140 In contrast, a
defendant’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel is
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012); see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 122, § 4261.1
(describing this provision as “[p]robably the most important change made by the 1996
statute” and noting that clause (1) (pertaining to decisions contrary to, or involving and
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law) “clearly makes a significant
change in referring only to law determined by the Supreme Court”).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2012); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 122, § 4261.1
(“The statute amends both 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Appellate Rule 22 with regard to appeals. A
state prisoner wishing to appeal the denial of habeas corpus had previously been required to
obtain a certificate of probable cause. This is now called a certificate of appealability. It may
issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right and it must indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy that requirement.”).
135. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
136. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967) (“[I]n addition to counsel’s
presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at
any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence
might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial. The security of that right is as much
the aim of the right to counsel as it is of the other guarantees of the Sixth Amendment . . . .”).
137. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
138. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“Government violates the right
to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make
independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.”); see also Perry v. Leeke, 488
U.S. 272 (1989); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
139. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A) (2012); Martinez v. Ryan 566 U.S. 1 (2012).
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generally not cognizable on direct review.141 This is because these claims
typically require development of facts outside the record in the underlying
proceeding.142 This second category of right to counsel violations,
therefore, must typically be brought in a collateral challenge to a
conviction.143
The most common claim, by a wide margin, brought by state and federal
prisoners in habeas petitions is ineffective assistance of counsel.144 And, as
these claims generally require development of facts outside the record, the
vast majority of Strickland claims are funneled through a post-conviction
review process.145 Most criminal convictions in the United States result
from state (not federal) prosecutions. As a result, most federal habeas
petitions are filed by state (not federal) prisoners.146 The upshot is that
Strickland jurisprudence has developed almost exclusively in the context of
federal court review of state court convictions.
Pertinent to this article, when reviewing a petition from a state prisoner,
AEDPA requires federal courts to apply a highly deferential standard of
review. In reviewing a prisoner’s habeas claim that a state court violated his
federal constitutional rights, a federal court asks whether the state court
decision was (1) contrary to, or involved an objectively unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the

141. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
142. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 770-71 (2017) (noting that ineffective assistance
of counsel issues must nonetheless be raised on state direct appeal and in the state postconviction petition to preserve them for federal habeas review and to avoid a federal
procedural default on collateral review unless the state process formally excludes those
claims from direct review); Johnson v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 1802, 1805 (2016) (“‘The general rule
in federal habeas cases is that a defendant who fails to raise a claim on direct appeal is
barred from raising the claim on collateral review.’ Likewise, state postconviction remedies
generally ‘may not be used to litigate claims which were or could have been raised at trial or
on direct appeal.’”) (citations omitted).
143. See Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 771.
144. Brandon L. Garrett, Validating the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 927,
936-37 (2013) (“Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are the most commonly litigated
claims during postconviction proceedings.”) (citation omitted).
145. See id. at 938-40.
146. See Table C-2. U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of
Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2014
and 2015, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/C02Sep15.pdf (last visited
Mar. 1, 2018) (showing that in 2015, 18,448 habeas corpus petitions were filed in federal
court, and of these only 2417 were brought by federal prisoners).
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facts.147 The extremely circumscribed nature of federal review of state
prisoners’ claims reflects the status of individual states as separate
sovereigns with a primary authority over and superior interest in resolving
challenges to state court convictions.148
By the time a state prisoner asserting a Sixth Amendment claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is before a federal court, all state court
rulings on her claim are practically untouchable. Strickland requires a
petitioner to show that counsel committed a prejudicial, unprofessional
error that is not entitled to deference;149 federal habeas law requires the
147. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012) (providing that a writ of habeas corpus “shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication”: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding”); see also Harrington v. Richter, 528 U.S. 86, 96-99 (2011); Richardson v.
Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2012); Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir.
2006) (“A decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of clearly established federal law if it
‘unreasonably applies’ a Supreme Court precedent to the facts of the petitioner’s claim.”)
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)); Winston v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 535,
554 (4th Cir. 2010) (“For a state court’s factual determination to be unreasonable under §
2254(d)(2), it must be more than merely incorrect or erroneous. It must be sufficiently
against the weight of the evidence that it is objectively unreasonable.”) (citation omitted).
148. Richardson, 668 F.3d at 138 (“The limited scope of federal review of a state
petitioner’s habeas claims . . . is grounded in fundamental notions of state sovereignty.”)
(citation omitted); Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103 (stating that because “[f]ederal habeas
review frustrates both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith
attempts to honor constitutional rights,” § 2254(d) is “designed to confirm that state courts
are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions”)
(quotation omitted). But see Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and
Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 507 (2007) (“Whatever the role for perceived
congressional purposes in statutory interpretation, courts—as faithful interpreters of legal
texts—may legitimately rely on that perception only to the extent that it is accurate. Based
on what we know about AEDPA, the 104th Congress had no interpretively meaningful
purposes beyond the words it ratified . . . . ‘Comity, finality, and federalism’ is now the
favored idiom for erroneously invoking a legislative mood; it has become the means by
which courts express an illegitimate hostility towards exacting standards of criminal
procedure.”).
149. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381-82 (1986) (“[R]easonableness of
counsel’s performance is . . . evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged
error and in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly
deferential . . . . [I]n determining the existence vel non of prejudice, the court ‘must consider
the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.’ As is obvious, Strickland’s standard,
although by no means insurmountable, is highly demanding.”) (citations to Strickland
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petitioner to show that the state court applied Strickland in an objectively
unreasonable manner when it rejected her federal ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.150 When the federal habeas standard of review of state court
resolutions of federal constitutional claims is merged with the Strickland
standard, the result is a double deference hurdle that state prisoners must
clear to obtain federal relief for Strickland right to counsel violations. This
“double deference” review requires the federal court to determine “not
whether counsel's actions were reasonable,” but “whether there is any
reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential
standard.”151
Under this standard, when a state prisoner presents an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in federal court, the “pivotal question is whether
the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was
unreasonable.”152 This inquiry is a much different question from whether a
state court erred in applying Strickland because an erroneous application of
federal law is not the same thing as an unreasonable application of federal
law.153 Under AEDPA, therefore, a state court determination that a
petitioner’s Strickland claim is without merit bars federal habeas relief if
“‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s

omitted); id. at 384 (presuming counsel’s competence and stating that the petitioner must
“rebut this presumption by proving that his attorney’s representation was unreasonable under
prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy”); id. at
384 (stating that counsel is required to investigate, but “a particular decision not to
investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a
heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments”) (quotation omitted).
150. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (stating that when determining
whether counsel’s behavior was deficient, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance”);
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 687 (2002) (explaining that to be entitled to relief based on
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of federal constitutional right to counsel, state
prisoner needs to show not only that Strickland standard is met, but also that Tennessee court
“applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner”).
151. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105; see also Richardson, 668 F.3d at 139 (stating that
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reviewed not only through the limitations of
AEDPA, but also “through the additional lens of Strickland and its progeny,” and that, taken
together, AEDPA and Strickland provide “dual and overlapping” standards that are applied
“simultaneously rather than sequentially”) (citation omitted).
152. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99-10; see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011).
153. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (“‘[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is
different from an incorrect application of federal law.’”) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 410 (2000)).
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decision.”154 At least as articulated by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
a federal court’s habeas review of a state prisoner’s claim is limited to
whether the state court’s determination “‘was so lacking in justification that
[it] was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond
any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’”155 If the answer is “no,”
federal courts must deny even meritorious Strickland claims brought by
state prisoners.156 Since the most common state prisoner habeas claim
brought in federal court is an allegation of the denial of effective assistance
of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, this double deference
review is implicated in and will be dispositive of the vast majority of state
prisoners’ federal habeas claims.157 The interplay of this statutory and
doctrinal deference render state court prisoners’ Strickland claims virtually
unreviewable in federal court.158
Where the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel stems from a plea
deal, habeas petitioners may also need to clear yet a third deference hurdle.
The Court most recently applied Strickland to plea bargaining in Missouri
v. Frye159 and Lafler v. Cooper.160 In those cases, the Court held that where
154. Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
155. Richardson, 668 F.3d at 141 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103); see also Ouska
v. Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that only clear error in applying
Strickland standard will support federal writ of habeas corpus because Strickland builds in
elements of deference to counsel’s choices in conducting the litigation, and AEDPA adds a
layer of respect for a state court’s application of the legal standard) (citation omitted).
156. Richardson, 668 F.3d at 139 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102) (finding that a
state prisoner’s petition has merit does not warrant federal habeas relief because “even a
strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable”).
157. Garrett, supra note 144, at 935-37 (noting Strickland’s central role in “redefining
criminal trial practice and postconviction review” due, in part to its “chameleon-like
adaptability” and the fact that Strickland claims “can broadly incorporate all sorts of
theories about what went wrong at the criminal trial-just so long as those failures can be
attributed to defense counsel.”).
158. Stuart E. Walker, What We Meant Was . . . The Supreme Court Clarifies Two
Ineffective Assistance Cases in Bell v. Cone, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1271, 1288 (2003) (stating
that the Court’s narrow interpretation of standards for federal habeas relief present a
“formidable barrier” to habeas petitioners, and after Bell “many state prisoners seeking
federal habeas relief for ineffective assistance claims may face a dim future”); Wayne M.
Helge, Know Your Client: The Mundane Case of Wiggins v. Smith, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 581, 594 (2005) (“[V]iewed in light of Strickland’s presumption of reasonable
professional conduct by counsel,” Bell makes “state court holdings practically
unchallengeable on the merits.”).
159. 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
160. 566 U.S. 156 (2012).
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a plea offer has lapsed or is rejected due to defense counsel’s error,
Strickland requires petitioner to show, among other things, that the trial
court would have accepted a re-offered or rejected plea.161 Whether to
accept or reject a plea offer, of course, is a decision that is generally left to a
trial court’s wide discretion.162 Thus, to the extent acceptance or rejection of
a plea offer is a discretionary decision with the trial court, Lafler and Frye
inject yet another layer of deference into the Strickland analysis in the
context in which the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are
resolved.163
II. Statutory Regulation of Defense Counsel in Tribal Court
Tribal nations did not participate in the ratification or amendment of the
Constitution. Tribal governments, therefore, are not constrained by the
federal Constitution.164 The procedural safeguards mandated by the Bill of
161. Frye, 566 U.S. at 148 (stating that where a plea lapses or is rejected due to counsel’s
incompetence, under Strickland prejudice, petitioners must show (1) a reasonable probability
they would have accepted the earlier plea offer and, (2) a reasonable probability neither the
prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accepted or
implemented if, under that jurisdiction’s laws, the prosecution had the discretion to withdraw
it, or the trial court had the discretion to refuse to accept it); see also Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (holding that the failure of a lawyer accurately to inform a
criminal defendant of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel); Cooper, 566 U.S. at 172-73 (finding that a plea rejected on counsel’s
erroneous legal advice, whether the state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)” was not a stumbling block because
the state court had failed to apply the clearly established law set forth in Strickland)
(quotation omitted) (“[T]he Michigan Court of Appeals identified respondent’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim but failed to apply Strickland to assess it. Rather than applying
Strickland, the state court simply found that respondent’s rejection of the plea was knowing
and voluntary . . . . By failing to apply Strickland to assess the ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim respondent raised, the state court’s adjudication was contrary to clearly
established federal law.”).
162. Frye, 566 U.S. at 150 (finding that after the plea offered to Frye lapsed, he was
arrested on a new offense while out on bond). In addressing the Strickland prejudice prong,
the Frye Court observed that “there [wa]s reason to doubt that the prosecution would have
adhered to the agreement or that the trial court would have accepted it . . . unless they were
required by state law to do so.” Id.
163. Id. at 143 (noting that ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty
pleas).
164. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381-82 (1896) (stating that Indian tribes
established and were recognized as sovereign nations prior to adoption of Constitution and
had not ratified Constitution as the states had; tribes, therefore, not constrained by
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Rights for individuals accused of crimes, therefore, do not apply to
defendants in tribal court proceedings.165 Specifically, tribal governments
are not bound to extend criminal procedure guarantees set out in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution in tribal court
criminal investigations and proceedings.166 Nor are tribal courts bound by
state and federal interpretations of the protections in the Bill of Rights
dealing with tribal court criminal defendants.167 Although tribal courts are
not bound by the federal Constitution, federal statutory law imposes a
Constitution when dealing with tribal members); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676
(1990); Samuel E. Ennis & Caroline P. Mayhew, Federal Indian Law and Tribal Criminal
Justice in the Self-Determination Era, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421 (2013-2014) (“Since
Indian tribes ‘did not participate in the Constitutional Convention and did not “sign on” by
joining the federal union,’ they are not bound by the Constitution, absent affirmative
congressional action to the contrary. Rather, federal and state courts have recognized that
tribal courts generally retain inherent civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations
by virtue of their sovereign status.”) (footnotes omitted); Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 680
(1989) (“Blurring the lines between ‘state’ and ‘Indian tribe’ may obscure the political
differences between the two ‘sovereigns.’ At least in theory, states have entered into a
compact, called the United States Constitution, and willfully ceded powers to a central
government. At least in theory, states participate via their representatives in Congress in the
decisions of the national government. Such claims cannot be made, even in theory, for the
Indian tribes, whose representatives neither signed the Constitution nor sit in Congress.”).
165. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1962 (2016) (“As separate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority. The
Bill of Rights . . . therefore, does not apply in tribal-court proceedings.”) (quotation
omitted); see also Talton, 163 U.S. 376; United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 777 (6th
Cir. 1997) (“Of course, Talton was decided decades before most of the protections of the
Bill of Rights were held to be binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .
Nonetheless, Talton has come to stand for the proposition that neither the Bill of Rights nor
the Fourteenth Amendment operates to constrain the governmental actions of Indian tribes,
and the Supreme Court has consistently decided cases with that understanding.”); Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns pre-existing the
Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional
provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority . . . . [T]he lower
federal courts have extended the holding of Talton to other provisions of the Bill of Rights,
as well as to the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted).
166. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49; Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 164.
167. See Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 164, at 436-37. That does not mean tribal court
defendants are without protection from tribal government overreach or unfairness. On the
contrary, tribal governments, through tribal law, provide procedural protections to tribal
court criminal defendants. See generally CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 2015).
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number of restraints on tribal governments similar, but not identical to, the
limitations on state and federal power found in the Bill of Rights.168 The
source of tribal court defendants’ federal statutory procedural rights is the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”).169 ICRA incorporates some, but
not all, of the specific guarantees found in the Bill of Rights. Some are
identical to the language in the Bill of Rights, while others are not.170
168. As the Constitution does for states, ICRA sets the floor, not the ceiling, for tribal
court criminal procedure. Like states, tribes can provide more expansive protections to
criminal defendants than what is required by federal law. Notwithstanding the commonlyinvoked floor-ceiling analogy, it is important to acknowledge the extraordinarily outsized
influence federal criminal procedure law has on process in the courts of other sovereigns.
See Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 S. CT. REV.
65, 79 (“[W]herever federal criminal procedure law exists today, that law dominates the
landscape. Federal constitutional criminal procedure law no longer serves as a vaguely
defined ‘floor,’ above which the states are free to develop and administer their criminal
justice systems with relative independence. Rather, federal law today serves as a floor and a
ceiling and everything in between . . . .”).
169. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 13011303 (2012)).
170. See Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016) (“ICRA, ‘rather than
providing in wholesale fashion for the extension of constitutional requirements to tribal
governments, as had been initially proposed, selectively incorporated and in some instances
modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political, cultural, and
economic needs of tribal governments.’ Thus, in ICRA, ‘Congress accorded a range of
procedural safeguards to tribal-court defendants “similar, but not identical, to those
contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.”’”) (citations omitted). Like
the Bill of Rights, ICRA provides for the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures; requires probable cause and particularity for warrants; prohibits double jeopardy
and compelled self-incrimination; provides rights to a speedy and public trial, notice of
charges, confrontation of witness, compulsory process, and counsel; prohibits excessive bail,
fines and cruel and unusual punishment; requires equal protection and due process; prohibits
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. It also provides for six-person juries. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(a)(2012); see also Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal
Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 478 (2005) (identifying “the two primary rights
‘missing’ from ICRA [as] free representation for indigent defendants and a jury that includes
nonmembers”); CONFERENCE OF W. ATTORNEYS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK §
7:5 (May 2017 update) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK] (“The ICRA extends
to tribal governments certain protections guaranteed under the Bill of Rights with respect to
federal and state governments. The need to provide such rights statutorily can be traced back
to Talton v. Mayes, where the Supreme Court concluded that the Cherokee Nation could use
grand juries whose number of members did not meet the requirements of the United States
Constitution in connection with the prosecution of one tribal member for a crime against
another member. The Court reasoned that, while the involved tribe was subject to the
dominant authority of Congress, its powers were those of a ‘local,’ or nonfederal,
government, unconstrained by the Fifth Amendment. This conclusion means that citizens of
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Important here, ICRA provides for a right to counsel in tribal court criminal
prosecutions.171 But the scope of what the ICRA right to counsel provisions
require differs depending on the status of the defendant as an Indian or nonIndian, and on the defendant’s potential sentence.172
In some instances, ICRA clearly and intentionally departs from the
federal constitutional right to counsel standard, and in others it purports to
mirror it. Of particular note, where a tribal court exercises criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, as recently authorized by the Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (“VAWA 2013”), ICRA
requires a more expansive right to appointed counsel for indigent
defendants than the Sixth Amendment requires in state and federal
courts.173
To understand ICRA’s differentiated right to counsel provisions, it is
necessary to understand tribal criminal jurisdiction.174 At the founding,
tribes had criminal jurisdiction over anyone who violated tribal law on
tribal land, just as states have criminal jurisdiction over anyone who
violates state law within their geographic boundaries. Shortly after the
states ratified the Constitution, Congress began limiting tribes’ jurisdiction
over non-Indians who committed crimes in Indian Country.175 Tribes
the United States, by virtue of their tribal membership, are subject to the commands of a
government within United States territory that is not fundamentally constrained by
constitutional norms. Since its first articulation, this core principle has never been
questioned.”) (footnotes omitted).
171. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1) (2012).
172. See infra Section II.A.
173. See infra Section II.A.3.
174. What follows is a very simplified overview of the legal history of tribal court
jurisdiction to allow the reader to track the discussion in this article; it does not purport to be
a comprehensive explanation of this very complex topic.
175. The Constitution was ratified on May 29, 1790. Congress began legislating tribes’
criminal jurisdiction with the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137. The
1790 Act and amendments to it formed the foundation for the current version of the Indian
Country Crimes Act (ICCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). The 1790 Act placed all interactions
with Indians under federal law and provided for federal jurisdiction over crimes committed
by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, § 5, 1
Stat. at 138. The Indian Country Crimes Act of 1817 subsequently reaffirmed federal
jurisdiction over all crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country and explicitly
acknowledged that tribes retained jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country by
one Indian against the person or property of another Indian. Pub. L. No., § 2, 3 Stat. 383, 383
(repealed 1834). The relevant provisions of the 1817 Act are now codified in the General
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, Pub. L.
No. 23-161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733, repealed the Indian Country Crimes Act of 1817, but
incorporated the latter’s criminal jurisdiction provision. Id. § 29, 4 Stat. at 733.
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retained their inherent authority over Indians who committed crimes on
tribal land176 until 1885, when Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act.177
The Major Crimes Act grants the federal government authority to prosecute
Indians who commit certain serious crimes in Indian Country, by making
those enumerated offenses federal crimes178 if committed by an Indian,179 in
Indian Country. This federal jurisdiction is concurrent with a tribe’s power
to prosecute and punish Indians who commit crimes within the tribe’s
territorial jurisdiction.180 Thus, with the Major Crimes Act, the federal
176. This understanding was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1883 in Ex parte Kangi-Shun-ca (Crow Dog), where the Supreme Court held that under federal treaty and
statutory law, tribes had inherent authority over violations of tribal law committed by
Indians on tribal land. 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883); see also Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S.
205, 209-12 (1973); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886).
177. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1153).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (2012) (“All Indians committing any offense listed in the first
paragraph of and punishable under section 1153 (relating to offenses committed within
Indian country) of this title shall be tried in the same courts and in the same manner as are all
other persons committing such offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.”); Act of Mar. 3, 1885, § 9, 23 Stat. at 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(2012)). It is not clear whether Congress intended the language “within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States” to extinguish tribal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes
committed by Indians in Indian country in favor of exclusive federal jurisdiction or, rather,
in favor of concurrent federal/state jurisdiction. See Troy Eid & Carrie Covington Doyle,
Separate But Unequal: The Federal Criminal Justice System in Indian Country, 81 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1067 (2010). The Major Crimes Act, however, has been interpreted to completely
divest state courts of jurisdiction over the crimes enumerated in the statute in Indian country
that is subject to federal criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 1082-83.
179. The current version of the Major Crimes Act enumerates fifteen offenses. These
enumerated offenses are, for the most part, defined by distinct federal statutes. Offenses that
are not defined by federal law are defined and punished in accordance with the law of the
state where the crime was committed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (2012). The crimes
enumerated in the Major Crimes Act are offenses against the person, such as murder and
assault that, if committed in a state jurisdiction, have traditionally and historically been left
to state governments to prosecute and punish. Id. § 1153(a).
180. Before Congress passed the Major Crimes Act, offenses committed by Indians in
Indian country were tried exclusively in tribal courts. According to the U.S. Department of
Justice, whether tribal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over offenses
covered by the Major Crimes Act remains an “open question.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATTORNEY’S MANUAL tit. 9 (1997). In this writer’s view, there is no question that tribes have
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government over the offenses covered by the Major
Crimes Act, albeit subject to congressionally mandated restrictions on the severity of the
punishment tribes can impose. Thus, tribes can, and do, independently criminalize, prosecute
and punish the types of crimes enumerated in the Major Crime Act under tribal codes, albeit
subject to the sentencing restrictions in ICRA discussed below. See Timothy J. Droske,
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government gave itself authority to prosecute and punish most serious
offenses of personal violence committed by Indians in Indian Country,
while tribes retained inherent authority to prosecute and punish both
member and non-member Indians for all crimes, including those described
in the Major Crimes Act, committed on tribal land.181 The result is that,
through a series of congressional acts and Supreme Court holdings, tribal
jurisdiction over crime in Indian Country is dependent on the status of the
defendant or victim as an Indian or non-Indian, and the nature of the crime
charged. Absent an explicit grant from Congress, tribes do not have
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians who commit offenses on
tribal land.182
Congress has also limited tribes’ authority to punish Indians who commit
crimes in their jurisdictions. ICRA’s general provisions (i.e., the non-TLOA
and non-VAWA 2013 provisions) limit the sentencing authority of tribal
courts.183 Even for serious offenses, ICRA’s general provisions limit the
penalty a tribal court can impose for a single offense to one-year
incarceration and a $5000 fine.184

Correcting Native American Sentencing Disparity Post-Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 737
(2008) (“Tribes . . . share concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government over Indian
defendants who have violated the Major Crimes Act although tribal courts are subject to the
sentencing limitations imposed by the Indian Civil Rights Act.”); see also Wetsit v. Stafne,
44 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that tribes retain concurrent jurisdiction over crimes
enumerated in the Major Crimes Act).
181. 42 C.J.S. Indians § 180 (2017) (“A tribe has the inherent power to punish its
members, as an aspect of its sovereignty. Further, Congress enacted legislation specifically
authorizing a tribe to prosecute Indian members of a different tribe. Thus, under the statutory
definitions regarding constitutional rights of Indians, ‘powers of self-government’ means the
inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians. Accordingly, an Indian tribe may exercise inherent sovereign
judicial power in criminal cases against nonmember Indians for crimes committed on the
tribe’s reservation. The source of an Indian tribe’s power to prosecute and punish an Indian,
who is not a member of the tribe is, in view of this federal statute, inherent tribal sovereignty
rather than delegated federal authority.”) (footnotes omitted). As noted below, although
tribes have inherent authority to prosecute and punish Indians for tribal offenses, tribal
courts cannot impose a punishment over one year even for the most serious crimes
committed in their jurisdictions unless they comply with the requirements of TLOA.
182. Id. (“[T]he inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes does not extend to criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on a reservation. Tribal courts have no
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians unless specifically authorized to assume such
jurisdiction by Congress.”) (footnotes omitted).
183. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304 (2012).
184. Id. § 1302(a)(7)(B).
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In 2010, Congress amended the sentencing provisions in ICRA to
authorize tribal courts to impose a sentence over one year and up to three
years, and a fine of up to $15,000,185 but only if: (1) the defendant has been
previously convicted of, or is being prosecuted for, the same or a
comparable offense or if the defendant is convicted of a felony-type
offense;186 and (2) the tribal court extends specific procedural protections to
the defendant.187 For related offenses, ICRA permits stacking offenses up to
a total sentence of no more than nine years.188
Congress amended ICRA again when it passed the VAWA 2013. Under
the VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA, for the first time since Congress
limited tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, it authorized some
tribes189 to exercise criminal jurisdiction over some non-Indians190 for some

185. Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, § 234, 124 Stat. 2258, 2280 (codified at 25 U.S.C §
1302 (2012)).
186. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(2012). Before TLOA, tribal court sentencing authority was
capped at one year for all offenses. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) currently provides:
A tribal court may subject a defendant to a term of imprisonment greater than 1
year but not to exceed 3 years for any 1 offense, or a fine greater than $5,000
but not to exceed $15,000, or both, if the defendant is a person accused of a
criminal offense who—(1) has been previously convicted of the same or a
comparable offense by any jurisdiction in the United States; or (2) is being
prosecuted for an offense comparable to an offense that would be punishable by
more than 1 year of imprisonment if prosecuted by the United States or any of
the States.
Id.
187. For example, § 1302(c) of ICRA requires tribes to provide the right to effective
assistance of counsel(at public expense if indigent) to all defendants who receive a sentence
of more than one year:
In a criminal proceeding in which an Indian tribe, in exercising powers of selfgovernment, imposes a total term of imprisonment of more than 1 year on a
defendant, the Indian tribe shall—(1) provide to the defendant the right to
effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by the United
States Constitution; and (2) at the expense of the tribal government, provide an
indigent defendant the assistance of a defense attorney licensed to practice law
by any jurisdiction in the United States that applies appropriate professional
licensing standards and effectively ensures the competence and professional
responsibility of its licensed attorneys.
Id. § 1302(c).
188. Id. § 1302(a)(7)(D).
189. Tribes initially needed to be approved by the Department of Justice to exercise
VAWA 2013 jurisdiction. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 317 (2016).
190. The VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA are codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304. Section
1304(b)(1) describes the nature of tribal courts’ VAWA 2013 jurisdiction “to exercise
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domestic violence offenses committed on tribal land.191 As with the TLOA
amendments to ICRA, for a tribal court to exercise jurisdiction under
VAWA 2013, it is required to provide the defendant with procedural
protections beyond those required by ICRA’s general provisions.192

special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” as extending “over all persons” (i.e., not just
Indians):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in addition to all powers of selfgovernment recognized and affirmed by sections 1301 and 1303 of this title,
the powers of self-government of a participating tribe include the inherent
power of that tribe, which is hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1). Section 1304(a)(6) defines “special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction” as “the criminal jurisdiction that a participating tribe may exercise under this
section but could not otherwise exercise.” Id. § 1304(a)(6). Indian defendants are also
subject to prosecution for domestic violence offense enumerated in VAWA 2013. However,
the primary aim of the “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” created by VAWA
2013 was to increase safety in Indian Country by authorizing tribes to exercise jurisdiction
over non-Indians living or working in Indian Country who commit domestic violence
offenses against Indians in tribal communities because non-Indian offenders often fell into
the void between a lack of tribal jurisdiction and a lack of federal prosecution. See Cynthia
Castillo, Tribal Courts, Non-Indians, and the Right to an Impartial Jury After the 2013
Reauthorization of VAWA, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 311, 314 (2014-2015) (citing underenforcement of crimes of sexual violence as the impetus for VAWA 2013 special domestic
violence jurisdiction over some non-Indians). To fall within a tribe’s VAWA 2013 criminal
jurisdiction, a non-Indian must have some connection to the tribe—such as working or living
in the community; or being married to, or in an intimate or dating relationship with an Indian
who is a member of the tribe, or with a non-member Indian living in the community. 25
U.S.C. § 1304(a)(6).
191. VAWA 2013 added a section to ICRA titled “Tribal Jurisdiction Over Crimes of
Domestic Violence”, authorizing “participating” tribes “to exercise special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons” (i.e., over Indians and non-Indians) who
commit specific offenses in Indian country. 25 U.S.C. § 1304. The offenses are limited to
domestic violence, dating violence, and violations of protection orders involving an Indian
victim. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat.
54. The driving force behind VAWA 2013 was the federal government’s failure to
adequately prosecute domestic violence crimes in Indian country.
192. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d). TLOA and VAWA 2013 create an opt-in scheme—tribes that
cannot or do not want to tailor their tribal court criminal procedure to satisfy the
requirements of TLOA and VAWA 2013 remain subject only to ICRA’s pre-TLOA and preVAWA 2013 requirements.
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A. ICRA’s Differentiated Right to Counsel
1. Pre-ICRA: No Federal Right to Counsel in Tribal Court
Before Congress enacted ICRA in 1968, there was no federal statutory
right to counsel in tribal court. In addition, until 1961, federal law actually
prohibited attorneys from appearing in tribal court.193 This federal policy
dates its origin to 1824, with the establishment of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (“BIA”).194 The BIA was originally housed in the War Department,
and, in 1849, was transferred to the Department of the Interior (“DOI”). 195
In 1883, after the BIA was transferred to the DOI, the DOI created the
Courts of Indian Offenses to “establish and impose an adversarial justice
system” in Indian Country.196 In establishing these courts, the DOI created a
civil and criminal code and “mandated the adversary system on the
reservation for criminal matters.”197 From its inception, the Courts of Indian
Offenses prohibited participation by attorneys to make sure there would be
“[n]o lawyers to perplex the judges.”198
2. ICRA of 1968: Right to Retained Counsel for (Indian) Defendants
Under ICRA’s general provisions, which only apply to Indians, a
defendant has a right to counsel, but only at his own expense.199 This, of
course, differs from the federal constitutional guarantee of right to counsel
193. See Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of Crime: A Tribal
and Congressional Imperative, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 341 (2013) (noting that the Code
of Federal Regulations prohibited attorneys in tribal court until 1961).
194. Id. at 339.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 340.
197. Id.
198. Id. (“As blatant federal instrumentalities, one would assume that the Courts of
Indian Offenses provided a right to counsel at least consistent with the federal Constitution
and provide for Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. In fact, the opposite was true. Courts of
Indian Offenses prohibited the appearance of attorneys.”).
199. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2012) ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of selfgovernment shall . . . deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right . . . at his own
expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense (except as provided in subsection
[c]).”). Subsections (b) and (c) were added following enactment of TLOA. The reference to
subsection (b) in 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) appears to be a typo since subsection (b) is an
enhanced sentencing provision and subsection (c) covers the procedural protections
(including the right to counsel at public expense for indigents) that a tribal court must
provide if it seeks to exercise the enhanced sentencing powers described in subsection (b).
See also Creel, supra note 193, at 341 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 11.9 (1958) (repealed by 26 Fed.
Reg. 4360-61 (proposed May 19, 1961)).
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at public expense for indigent defendants charged with a felony200 or with a
misdemeanor for which the defendant is incarcerated.201 Congress enacted
ICRA in 1968, five years after Gideon, where the Supreme Court held that
the Sixth Amendment required appointment of counsel to indigent
defendants at public expense in state and federal felony cases.202 Despite the
chronology, the fact that Congress did not include a Gideon-type provision
in ICRA should not necessarily be interpreted as an intent to create a right
to counsel with a scope different from the Constitution. As enacted, ICRA
limited the punishment tribal courts could impose to misdemeanor-type
penalties. In 1968 when ICRA was enacted, the Gideon right to appointed
counsel extended only to felony cases.203 Thus, when Congress enacted
200. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
201. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see also United States v. Doherty, 126
F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162
(2001) (“ICRA provides for a right to counsel, but does not extend that right to the limits of
the Sixth Amendment . . . [and] the tribes are not required to provide counsel to the indigent
accused in felony prosecutions, despite the Sixth Amendment holding to the contrary in
Gideon v. Wainwright.”).
202. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
203. As enacted, ICRA limited tribes’ sentencing authority to a maximum of six months’
imprisonment and/or a $500 fine: “No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall . . . impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than
imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or both . . . .” Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, § 202, 82 Stat. 77, 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
1302(a)(7)(B) (1970)). Congress amended ICRA in 1986 to increase the maximum sentence
to one-year imprisonment and/or a $5000 fine. Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit.
IV, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-001, 3207-146. Following enactment of TLOA in 2010, the
section was revised to raise the one-year incarceration cap for each offense to three years,
the $5000 fine cap to $15,000, and to allow tribal courts to stack offenses to impose a term
of incarceration of up to nine years for some offenses in proceedings complying with
TLOA’s procedural requirements, including the provision of bar-licensed counsel at public
expense to indigents sentenced to more than a year or more than $5000. Tribal Law and
Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, § 234, 124 Stat. 2261, 2280. These ICRA
provisions currently read:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall—
....
[(7)](B) except as provided in subparagraph (C), impose for conviction of
any 1 offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term
of 1 year or a fine of $5,000, or both;
(C) subject to subsection (b) [providing for enhanced penalties in specific
cases], impose for conviction of any 1 offense any penalty or punishment
greater than imprisonment for a term of 3 years or a fine of $15,000, or both; or
(D) impose on a person in a criminal proceeding a total penalty or
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of 9 years.
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ICRA, indigent tribal court defendants (at this time, limited to Indians)204
were in no different position under ICRA than indigent state defendants
under the federal Constitution.205
In 1972, post-ICRA, the Supreme Court extended the Gideon right to
counsel at public expense to indigents in misdemeanor cases that result in
either actual imprisonment, no matter how brief,206 or in a suspended
sentence that includes a term of imprisonment.207 Congress amended ICRA
in 1986 to increase tribal court sentencing authority from six months and
$500, to one year and $5000.208 But it did not re-visit ICRA’s right to
counsel provisions despite the change in the federal constitutional right to
counsel at public expense, which now required that counsel be appointed
not just in all felony cases, but also in misdemeanors involving actual
imprisonment. The constitutional rights of indigent state and federal court
defendants, therefore, were expanded to cover some misdemeanors, but the
federal statutory rights of tribal court defendants under ICRA remained
unchanged. Unlike indigent state and federal court defendants who are
entitled to counsel at public expense in any felony case or in any
misdemeanor case that results in actual imprisonment or a suspended
sentence of imprisonment, indigent tribal court defendants outside TLOA
and VAWA 2013 prosecutions (i.e., Indian defendants facing incarceration
of one year or less) still have the right only to the assistance of retained
counsel.209

25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B)-(D) (2012).
204. Under the 1968 version of ICRA, this provision applied only to Indians because, at
the time, only Indians were subject to tribal jurisdiction.
205. Creel, supra note 193, at 347 (“[I]n 1968, the Supreme Court had not yet extended
the right to counsel to . . . misdemeanor offenses . . . . Thus, with regard to the right to
counsel debate of the time, ICRA’s provision of a right to counsel at the Indian’s own
expense was equivalent to the right to counsel in the states.”) (footnotes omitted).
206. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33 (“We are by no means convinced that legal and
constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a
brief period are any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or
more.”).
207. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
208. See supra note 203.
209. Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that procedural
safeguards of ICRA largely mirror those of the federal constitution, both in content and the
levels of generality of their protections, but declining to construe ICRA’s due process
requirement to find a right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants because ICRA
specifically addressed the right to counsel).
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3. TLOA and VAWA 2013: Jurisdiction over Non-Indians and ICRA’s
New Right to Counsel
As noted, the TLOA amendments to ICRA authorize tribal courts to
exceed the one year, $5000 sentencing cap under ICRA’s general
provisions, and impose a sentence up to three years and $15,000 if the
defendant: (1) has a prior conviction for the same or comparable offense in
a court of any jurisdiction within the United States; or (2) is being
prosecuted for an offense comparable to an offense punishable by more
than one-year “imprisonment if prosecuted by the United States or any of
the States.”210 It also authorizes tribal courts to stack sentences and impose
a sentence of up to nine years for offenses that are part of the same
transaction.211 To exercise the enhanced sentencing authority under the
TLOA amendments to ICRA,212 a tribal court must provide the following
specific procedural protections beyond those required by ICRA’s general
provisions:
$

the “right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that
guaranteed by the United States Constitution;”213

210. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012). TLOA does not define “comparable offense” or
indicate whether “any of the States” includes Indian nations—both issues that will need to be
determined by courts. See Quintin Cushner & Jon M. Sands, Tribal Law and Order Act of
2010: A Primer, with Reservations, CHAMPION, Dec. 2010, at 38, 39 (“What constitutes a
‘comparable offense’ will be a subject for future litigation. Further, defense attorneys may
wish to challenge whether the “or any of the States” language means that, for example, a
Navajo Indian defendant could face more than one-year imprisonment in a tribal court
within Utah’s boundaries for activity that is only punishable by more than one-year
imprisonment in Hawaii.”).
211. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
212. Ironically and perhaps, tellingly, although the U.S. Constitution does not extend to
Indian Country and although the sole source of a tribal court defendant’s federal procedural
rights is ICRA, the section of ICRA that lists the federal statutory rights tribal courts must
extend to defendants, 25 U.S.C. § 1302, is titled “Constitutional rights.”
213. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1). The general provisions of ICRA provide for the right to
assistance of counsel; they do not contain a right to effective assistance of counsel. That does
not mean, of course, that tribes cannot or do not guarantee defendants effective assistance of
counsel. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hopi Tribe, No. 00AC000002 (Hopi Tribe App. Ct. 2000),
reprinted in GARROW & DEER, supra note 167, at 443 (“The right to counsel implies
effective counsel. If an attorney’s performance in representing an accused is such as to
amount to no representation at all, the accused has clearly been deprived of effective
representation.”). It only means that effective assistance of counsel is not set out as a specific
right in the text of ICRA’s general provisions.
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$

for indigent defendants, “the assistance of a defense attorney
licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the United States that
applies appropriate professional licensing standards and effectively
ensures the competence and professional responsibility of its
licensed attorneys” at tribal expense;214

$

a judge with “sufficient legal training to preside over criminal
proceedings” who is licensed to practice law;215

$

publicly available criminal laws (including regulations and
interpretative documents), rules of evidence, and rules of criminal
procedure (including rules governing the recusal of judges in
appropriate circumstances);216 and

$

a record of the criminal proceeding, including an audio or other
recording of the trial proceeding.217

The TLOA additions to ICRA in 2010 reflect due process requirements
the Supreme Court imposed on states after Congress enacted ICRA in 1968.
This includes the right to counsel at public expense for indigent defendants
who receive a sentence of incarceration, as recognized in Argersinger v.
Hamlin in 1972,218 and the standard for effective assistance of counsel,
established in Strickland in 1984. These requirements, particularly the
requirements that tribal judges in TLOA proceedings be bar-licensed and
that tribes provide indigent TLOA defendants bar-licensed counsel at tribal
expense, impose “both a great cost on tribes interested in extending their
sentencing powers and a pressure to conform their systems to match federal
or state justice systems.”219
VAWA 2013, which authorizes tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction over
some non-Indians who commit some domestic violence offenses against
Indians on tribal land, was passed after TLOA; it incorporated TLOA’s
heightened procedural requirements, and added new, different ones.
VAWA 2013 added a new section to ICRA—§ 1304220 to implement and
214. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(2). The general provisions of ICRA do not require that counsel
be bar-licensed.
215. Id. § 1302(c)(3)(A), (B).
216. Id. § 1302(c)(4).
217. Id. § 1302(c)(5).
218. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
219. ICRA Reconsidered: New Interpretations of Familiar Rights, 129 HARV. L. REV.
1709, 1717 (2016) [hereinafter ICRA Reconsidered].
220. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d) sets out the “Rights of defendants” in VAWA 2013
prosecutions:
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authorize tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. This new section
imposes procedural requirements on tribes seeking to exercise what VAWA
2013 refers to as “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction.”221 To
exercise jurisdiction over VAWA 2013 defendants (anticipated to be nonIndians), tribes must provide them all the procedural protections required
under the general provisions of ICRA (found in 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)) and
the heightened protections under the TLOA amendments to ICRA, found in
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (set out above).222 In addition, tribes seeking to
exercise VAWA 2013 jurisdiction must provide defendants with two
guarantees not found in either ICRA’s general provisions or the TLOA
amendments. The first guarantee is a right to an “impartial jury,” which
Congress specifically defined for purposes of VAWA 2013 jurisdiction
using the language the Supreme Court developed to define an impartial jury
In a criminal proceeding in which a participating tribe exercises special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the participating tribe shall provide to
the defendant—
(1) all applicable rights under this Act [i.e., the rights set out in the general
provisions of ICRA found at §1302(a)];
(2) if a term of imprisonment of any length may be imposed, all rights
described in section 1302(c) of this title [the TLOA amendments to ICRA];
(3) the right to a trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that—
(A) reflect a fair cross section of the community; and
(B) do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in the community,
including non-Indians; and
(4) all other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of
the United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent
power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction over the defendant.
25 U.S.C. § 1304(d). As set out above, under the TLOA amendments to ICRA incorporated
into the VAWA 2013 provisions of ICRA, before a tribe can sentence a defendant to more
than one year or impose a fine over $5000, it must provide the right to constitutionally
effective assistance of counsel, and provide indigent defendants licensed counsel at tribal
expense; provide licensed and trained judges; make tribal laws and rules publicly available
before prosecuting a defendant; and ensure that courts are of record. Id. § 1302(c)(3)- (5).
221. Id. § 1304(d).
222. The TLOA amendments differ from the VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA in what
triggers their respective heightened procedural rights. TLOA rights are triggered if a tribe
seeks to “impose” a sentence over one year or $5000; in contrast, VAWA 2013 rights are
triggered when “a term of imprisonment of any length may be imposed.” The former reflects
an actual incarceration standard, the latter an authorized incarceration standard, representing
a dividing line in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence addressing the right to appointed counsel
for misdemeanors. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (citing Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the right for indigent misdemeanants is
triggered by actual incarceration, not authorized incarceration).
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under the Constitution.223 The second guarantee includes “all other rights
whose protection is necessary under the Constitution . . . in order for
Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power of the participating
tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction.”224
In summary, the TLOA and VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA, inter
alia, require tribes to ensure that defendants subject to ICRA’s TLOA
provisions (i.e., Indian defendants sentenced to more than one-year
incarceration or more than a $5000 fine), and to the VAWA 2013
amendments (defendants facing incarceration of any length for a VAWA
2013 offense) receive effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that
required by the Constitution and, if indigent, of bar-licensed counsel at
tribal expense. In addition, VAWA 2013 tribal court defendants (which
includes non-Indians) are entitled to an impartial jury, defined by reference
to the Sixth Amendment standard, and they are entitled to every other
(unspecified) federal constitutional right necessary for Congress to
recognize and affirm the tribes’ exercise of jurisdiction over non-Indians.225
B. Enforcing the Right in Federal Court: Habeas Review Under ICRA
ICRA provides all tribal court defendants the right to federal habeas
review of their tribal court convictions.226 It is an understatement to say
that, in comparison to AEDPA (the federal statute governing habeas review
of state and federal court convictions), the habeas provision applicable to
tribal court convictions under ICRA is astonishingly brief. It provides, in its
entirety: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to
223. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (mirroring the constitutional guarantee to a jury drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community using a procedure that does not systematically exclude
any distinctive group in the community).
224. Id.
225. These tiered rights for defendants charged under the general provisions of ICRA
(limited to Indians) and the VAWA 2013 provisions (which could include Indians, but which
is clearly intended for the benefit of non-Indians) raises the question of whether an Indian in
a VAWA 2013 tribal jurisdiction who is charged with a crime of domestic violence under
the non-VAWA 2013 provisions of ICRA might have an Equal Protection claim because
s/he would have been entitled to these greater protections had the tribal prosecutor charged
the conduct as a VAWA 2013 offense and thereby triggered the VAWA 2013 heightened
right to appointed counsel and the VAWA 2013 fair cross section/impartial jury rights.
226. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012) (“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be
available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by
order of an Indian tribe.”); Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
the exclusive means to enforce ICRA’s civil rights protections in federal court is through a
petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 1303) (“[E]xcept for habeas corpus challenges,
any private right of action under [the Indian Civil Rights] Act lies only in tribal court.”)
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any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his
detention by order of an Indian tribe.”227
As with the heightened procedural requirements ICRA imposes in TLOA
and VAWA 2013 prosecutions, ICRA habeas procedure is also more
protective of VAWA 2013 tribal court habeas petitioners. As part of the
VAWA 2013 amendments, ICRA allows a tribal prisoner who is
challenging a sentence of incarceration in a federal habeas petition to ask
the federal court who will hear the petition to stay the tribal court order of
detention pending federal habeas review.228 Under this new provision, the
federal court must grant a stay if it finds a substantial likelihood that the
habeas corpus petition will be granted, and if, after notice to the alleged
victims, it finds, by clear and convincing evidence that under conditions
imposed by the court, the petitioner is not likely to flee or pose a danger to
any person or the community if released.229
As a textual matter, ICRA’s new stay-of-detention provision could be
read to apply to all tribal court habeas petitioners, not just petitioners
convicted of a VAWA 2013 offense in tribal court. The stay of detention
provision is found in § 1304 of ICRA, which is the section implementing
the protections required of tribes exercising VAWA 2013 jurisdiction over
non-Indians. However, § 1304 refers to habeas petitions brought “under
section 1303,” the section of ICRA that authorizes federal court habeas
review over all tribal court convictions.230 Given the placement of the stay
of detention provision in § 1304, which is the VAWA 2013 section of
ICRA, it is likely Congress intended the stay of detention provision to
benefit non-Indians detained pursuant to a tribal court conviction pending
habeas review in federal court,231 not Indian petitioners.232

227. 25 U.S.C. § 1303.
228. Id. § 1304(e)(1).
229. This mirrors the federal bail statute, which requires release pretrial on conditions
unless the court finds, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant poses a
risk of flight or a danger to the community. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142
(2012).
230. . 25 U.S.C. § 1304(e)(1).
231. Carrie E. Garrow, Habeas Corpus Petitions in Federal and Tribal Courts: A Search
for Individualized Justice, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 137, 150-53 (2015) (stating that the
concept of citizenship as a “limiting principle on tribal powers . . . is found again in the
VAWA amendments to ICRA that allow non-Indians to seek a stay of detention when filing
a habeas petition”) (“Indians do not receive this same protection. The federal government
perceives their right to vote as enough protection against civil rights violations by tribal
governments. Fearful of civil rights violations, the government affords non-Indians to use
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The right to seek a stay of detention pending habeas review is not a right
available to petitioners seeking habeas review of a state or federal court
conviction. As with the right to counsel at public expense, ICRA’s habeas
corpus provisions provide procedural protections for tribal court defendants
greater than those the Constitution or federal law require for their state or
federal court counterparts.233 One of the animating forces for enacting
ICRA and imposing procedural requirements on tribes like those found in
the Constitution was an unease with tribal self-government, including a
skepticism about tribal courts’ competence and ability to be fair.234 This is a
theme Congress apparently revisited in its recent TLOA and VAWA 2013
amendments to ICRA.235
their U.S. citizenship as a cloak and request a stay of detention while their federal habeas
petition is pending.”)
232. A VAWA 2013 petitioner could, of course, be Indian or non-Indian. But in light of
VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence jurisdiction primary purpose—to allow tribal
courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians—it is a fair characterization of the VAWA
2013 amendments to ICRA as procedural protections intended primarily for the benefit of
non-Indian tribal court defendants.
233. As noted supra, the federal writ of habeas corpus was originally only available to
challenge detention by federal authorities. Following the Civil War, “fearful that the states of
the former Confederacy would undermine federal rights—especially the rights of the
freedmen and their allies—during Reconstruction,” Congress, by statute, authorized
challenges to state detention as well. See Michael C. Dorf, A Unanimous Supreme Court
Ruling Underscores the Limits of Habeas Corpus as a Remedy for State Prisoners, VERDICT
(May 22, 2013), https://verdict.justia.com/2013/05/22/a-unanimous-supreme-court-rulingunderscores-the-limits-of-habeas-corpus-as-a-remedy-for-state-prisoners. It appears that this
same fear and distrust animates the recent TLOA and VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA,
especially the new provision permitting release of a tribal court prisoner pending federal
review of his tribal court conviction.
234. ICRA Reconsidered, supra note 219, at 1718 (“As has been shown, throughout
European—and federal—Indian relations there has been a history of suspicion of Indian law
and self-government. And although Congress came to accept that tribal courts would have
jurisdiction over some cases, it became concerned with reports of abuse and the lack of Bill
of Rights protections for tribal members. Congress passed ICRA to bring (most of) the Bill
of Rights to tribal lands, but the Court in Santa Clara Pueblo limited the available remedies
for ICRA violations [to the habeas petition].”)
235. A distrust of tribal courts’ ability to be fair in dealing with persons outside their own
tribes is also reflected in the Court’s jurisprudence. See Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the
Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047,
1053-54 (2005) (“Since 1978, the Supreme Court has decimated tribal jurisdiction over
those that are not members of their tribes. Scholars . . . almost uniformly agree that the
decisions are not accurate reflections of established Indian law doctrine . . . . One might
simply dismiss this trend as racism or hostility to tribes. . . . But such accounts do not fully
explain why, within the same period, the Court has been relatively consistent in protecting
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The procedure governing federal habeas review of tribal court
convictions under ICRA is also more lenient than that governing review of
state or federal court convictions. As noted, petitioners seeking habeas
review of a state or federal conviction are subject to a one-year statute of
limitations in non-capital cases, to promote finality of state and federal
criminal judgments.236 There are no time limitations under the ICRA habeas
provision.237 As noted, AEDPA contains an exhaustion requirement—under
it, petitioners seeking review of state court convictions must exhaust their
state court remedies before seeking federal court review—and a doctrine of
extreme deference to state court determinations, even when they are
applying federal constitutional law.238 ICRA, on its face, does not impose
any limitations on petitioners seeking federal review of tribal court
convictions, except the requirement that the prisoner is limited to
challenging his “detention.”239 ICRA contains no statute of limitations,240
no bar on successive petitions,241 no exhaustion requirement, and no
standards of review.242 In the absence of statutory guidance, federal courts
have developed a common law for tribal court habeas review that imposes
some concepts familiar in the state habeas arena. For example, all federal
courts that have addressed the issue require tribal court petitioners, at
minimum, to establish that they are “in custody” and that they have
exhausted their tribal remedies.243
tribes and their members from state and federal jurisdiction . . . . These conflicting trends are
best explained by justices’ assumptions regarding what jurisdiction over outsiders means
both for outsiders and for tribes. More specifically, the decisions are rooted in the sense that
tribal courts will not be fair to nonmembers . . . .”).
236. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court.”); id. § 2244(d)(2) (sets out a tolling period, and § 2244(d)(1) provides for four
possible starting dates for the limitation period).
237. See Cushner & Sands, supra note 210, at 39.
238. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
239. Id. §§ 1301-1303.
240. See generally id. Given that pre-TLOA, tribal sentences were limited to one year, it
is not surprising that ICRA has no statute of limitations for tribal prisoner petitioners.
241. See generally id. Since a tribal court cannot, under any circumstances, sentence a
defendant to a term of incarceration longer than nine years, tribal court petitions have a
natural shelf life and successive petitions are, therefore, less of a concern than in the state
and federal system where sentences of life imprisonment and execution are possible.
242. See generally id.
243. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.09, at 780 (Nell Jessup Newton et
al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN] (“All federal courts addressing the issue mandate that
two prerequisites be satisfied before they will hear a habeas petition filed under the ICRA:
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1. The “In Custody” Requirement
The writ of habeas corpus, by its nature, requires that the habeas
petitioner be “in custody.” The remedy for a successful writ of habeas
corpus is release from custody, a reduction in sentence, or a remand for
further proceedings, such as an evidentiary hearing, new trial, or new
sentencing hearing.244 If a petitioner is not being detained and is not a
prisoner, there is no basis for habeas relief.245 Accordingly, AEDPA
requires that a petitioner be “in custody” to bring a federal habeas
petition.246 ICRA, similarly, is limited to challenges to tribal court
“detention,” and the Supreme Court has defined ICRA’s “detention”
language as a jurisdictional prerequisite for federal courts to hear a tribal
court habeas petition.247 To invoke a federal court’s § 1303 jurisdiction, a
tribal court petitioner must show he is subject to “conditions and
restrictions . . . [that] significantly restrain [his] liberty.”248 ICRA does not
define “detention,” but federal courts interpreting ICRA’s habeas provision
have interpreted the term “detention” similarly to the “in custody”
requirement in other habeas contexts.249 What restraints short of physical
incarceration amount to “detention” in the tribal context has not always
[(1)] The petitioner must be in custody, and [(2)] the petitioner must first exhaust tribal
remedies.”); see also Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We therefore
have no jurisdiction to hear a petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus, unless both [exhaustion
and the in custody] conditions are met. Any expansion of this jurisdiction must come from
Congress, not by decision of this court.”).
244. See generally COHEN, supra note 243, § 9.09, at 778-81.
245. Id.
246. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012).
247. See Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 918.
248. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963); see also Poodry v. Tonawanda
Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 236 (1963) (“[U]nder Jones and its progeny, a severe actual or potential restraint on
liberty” is necessary for jurisdiction under § 1303.”); Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 275 F. Supp.
2d 279, 285 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Poodry for the same proposition); Jeffredo, 599 F.3d
at 919 (“We agree with our colleagues on the Second Circuit and hold that § 1303 does
require ‘a severe actual or potential restraint on liberty.’”)).
249. See Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 2001) (“There is no reason to
conclude that the requirement of ‘detention’ set forth in the Indian Civil Rights Act § 1303 is
any more lenient than the requirement of ‘custody’ set forth in the other habeas statutes.”);
Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 918 (“ICRA habeas petition is only proper when the petitioner is in
custody.”); Poodry, 85 F.3d at 890 (holding that the ICRA habeas provision was not
intended to empower district courts to entertain petition for habeas relief in wider range of
circumstances than permitted by analogous provisions for relief from state and federal
custody).
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been clear. In applying this standard, lower federal courts have concluded,
for example, that revocation of a tribal permit,250 imposition of a fine,251
enforcement of a housing ordinance,252 and exclusion from tribal
employment and services253 do not constitute detention. The use of
banishment as a punishment, however, has been found to be a sufficient
restraint on liberty to trigger ICRA’s habeas jurisdiction.254
2. Exhaustion
Federal courts, similarly, have created common law standards for
petitions seeking review of tribal court proceedings in federal court.255 This
includes a requirement that parties to a lawsuit implicating tribal interests
first exhaust their remedies in tribal court before pursuing an action in
federal court.256 Absent exceptional circumstances, federal courts will
250. Walton v. Tesuque Pueblo, 443 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that
ICRA habeas provision did not confer jurisdiction on district court in action arising out of
revocation of flea market vendor’s permit, and that the revocation did not amount to a
restraint on liberty).
251. Moore, 270 F.3d at 790 (holding that the imposition of a fine alone does not satisfy
ICRA’s “detention” requirement).
252. Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 366 F.3d 89, 92 (2nd Cir. 2004) (holding that the tribe’s
enforcement of housing ordinance, resulting in destruction of some homes, did not constitute
sufficiently severe restraint on liberty to invoke federal court’s ICRA habeas corpus
jurisdiction).
253. Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 713 (2nd Cir. 1998) (holding
that the members of Oneida Nation did not suffer severe actual or potential restraint on
liberty, as required for ICRA habeas jurisdiction, when they were allegedly suspended or
terminated from employment positions and lost tribal privileges and benefits).
254. Poodry, 85 F.3d at 895 (stating that banishment notices served on members of
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians who had been “convicted of treason” a sufficient
“restraint on liberty” to permit district court to entertain ICRA habeas petition; Congress
could not have intended to permit tribe to circumvent ICRA’s habeas provision by
permanently banishing, rather than imprisoning, members “convicted” of offense of
treason); see also Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 971 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that the
disenrollment of tribal members and subsequent banishment from reservation constituted
“detention” under ICRA, even though the disenrolled members were already physically
banished from reservation).
255. COHEN, supra note 243, § 9.09, at 778-81; see also Selam v. Warm Springs Tribal
Corr. Facility, 134 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 1998) (exhaustion requirement); Nat’l Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480
U.S. 9 (1987).
256. COHEN, supra note 243, § 7.04[3], at 630 (“Even when a federal court has
jurisdiction over a claim, if the claim arises in Indian country, the court is required to stay its
hand until the party has exhausted all available tribal remedies.”) (citing LaPlante, 480 U.S.
at 16; Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. at 857; Selam, 134 F.3d at 953 (stating that “[t]he Supreme
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abstain from hearing cases that challenge tribal court authority until tribal
remedies, including tribal appellate review, are exhausted.257 The tribal
exhaustion doctrine applies to habeas corpus proceedings brought pursuant
to ICRA.258
The tribal exhaustion doctrine has three narrow exceptions in which a
federal court will not require a petitioner to establish that she has exhausted
her tribal court remedies before exercising jurisdiction: (1) where
harassment motivated a tribe’s exercise of jurisdiction; (2) if the tribal court
action violated an express jurisdictional prohibition; or (3) if requiring
resort to tribal remedies would be futile.259 Absent one of these exceptions,
a petitioner must exhaust her tribal remedies before seeking relief in federal
court.260
At first blush, the tribal exhaustion doctrine seems similar to its state
analog. But, unlike federal court review of state court decisions, at least
post-AEDPA, federal courts reviewing tribal court decisions do go behind
the exhaustion standard. And they ask not just whether the tribal court had a
procedure in place and whether it was exhausted, but also whether the
Court’s policy of nurturing tribal self-government strongly discourages federal courts from
assuming jurisdiction over unexhausted claims” unless party can show exhaustion would be
futile or that tribal courts offer no adequate remedy)); see also Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley,
115 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1997).
257. See Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2011);
Sweet v. Hinzman, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199-1200 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (holding that
absent contrary evidence, allegation that no tribal remedies existed for banished tribe
members to exhaust was sufficient to survive motion to dismiss ICRA habeas corpus petition
challenging banishment); Quair, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 971-72 (holding that the former tribal
members demonstrated exhaustion of remedies of their disenrollment and banishment; tribe
had no tribal court to which to appeal).
258. See, e.g., Selam, 134 F.3d at 954; Lyda v. Tah-Bone, 962 F. Supp. 1434, 1435-36
(D. Utah 1997); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978) (stating that
in evaluating a habeas petition, the Court is obligated to avoid needless intrusion on tribal
self-government).
259. See Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. at 851; Wounded Knee v. Andera, 416 F. Supp. 1236,
1239 (D.C.S.D. 1976) (holding that a petitioner is not required to go through motions of
exhaustion if resort to tribal remedies would be futile).
260. See Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding
that a member of an Indian tribe is required to exhaust tribal court remedies before filing
federal habeas petition, and that ignorance of the law is not a sufficient excuse for failing to
satisfy tribal procedural requirements); Navajo Nation v. Intermountain Steel Bldgs., Inc., 42
F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1226 (D.N.M. 1999); Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 917-18 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that a federal court has no jurisdiction to hear a tribal court petitioner’s
habeas corpus claim unless both in custody and exhaustion conditions both met) (“Any
expansion of this jurisdiction must come from Congress, not by decision of this court.”).
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process was fair.261 In Greywater v. Joshua, for example, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals did not require exhaustion where there was no record of
the tribal court’s ruling on a motion, but where, notwithstanding the lack of
a record, the Eighth Circuit found there was other evidence in the record
that the petitioner had not received a fair hearing.262 More to the point,
whether federal courts require a tribal court petitioner to exhaust his tribal
court remedies before seeking federal relief may depend on whether the
petitioner is Indian or not.263 Given this background, there is a real question
as to whether federal courts will apply the exhaustion requirement to a

261. This raises a secondary question of how formal a tribal court procedure needs to be
to qualify for the exhaustion requirement. See Necklace v. Tribal Court of Three Affiliated
Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation, 554 F.2d 845, 846 (1977) (holding that an Indian
committed to state hospital pursuant to tribal court order is not required to exhaust tribal
remedies before seeking habeas corpus where there appeared to be informal procedures by
which to seek relief in tribal court, but tribal law had no formal habeas corpus procedure).
262. Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 489 (1988) (holding that exhaustion of tribal
remedies is not required before petitioning for habeas corpus to challenge jurisdiction of
tribal court where trial court denied motion to dismiss without a record and, according to the
federal court, there were “strong grounds in the record” suggesting that the petitioners did
not receive fair hearing in the tribal court). Oddly, the Greywater court criticized the tribal
court for failing to make a record, yet relied on extra record evidence to find strong grounds
in the record that the tribal court proceeding was unfair, rather than remand the matter to the
tribal court to create a record. The “strong grounds in the record” relied on by the Greywater
court was an allegation (which was not in the record) about the arrest at issue, and the facts
surrounding the t . Id. at 489 (“Furthermore, there are strong grounds in the record to suggest
that Petitioners did not receive a fair hearing in the Tribal Court . . . . The tribal court judge,
moreover, allegedly chided Petitioners that as nonmembers of the Sioux Tribe they would
not receive a fair trial because only Sioux would be on the jury. The facts surrounding the
arrest and charges lend additional corroboration to this concern. The person driving the car
at the time of the arrests was a member of the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe as were the arresting
officers. The passengers all were nonmember Chippewa Indians; only the nonmembers were
arrested.”)
263. See Garrow, supra note 231, at 150-53. In her article, Professor Garrow describes a
survey that found only five cases where federal courts did not require exhaustion of tribal
remedies. Four involved either non-Indian petitioners or Indians who were not members of
the prosecuting tribe that were decided at a point when the Supreme Court treated nonmember Indians the same as non-Indians for tribal court jurisdictional purposes. Those
cases, as the author explains, would be treated different today. The remaining case in which
the federal reviewing court did not require exhaustion requirement involved an Indian
petitioner. But in that case, Professor Garrow notes, the Tribe appears to have waived the
issue because it did not raise exhaustion as a bar. Id. (citing Connor v. Conklin, No. A4-0450, 2004 WL 1242513 (D.N.D. June 2, 2004)).
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petition brought by a non-Indian seeking to challenge a tribe’s assertion of
VAWA 2013 jurisdiction.264
Under AEDPA, federal courts may not review a state court’s denial of a
federal constitutional claim if the state court’s decision rests on a state
procedural ground that is independent of the federal question, and adequate
to support the judgment. The doctrine of “adequate and independent”
grounds is frequently invoked to bar federal review of state court
convictions as an expression of deference to the other sovereign’s superior
interest in disposing of challenges of criminal convictions under its own
laws. 265
The deference extended to states under this doctrine is not always
extended to tribal court decisions in federal habeas review. In Alvarez v.
Tracey, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted habeas
relief to a petitioner who contended that a tribe had denied him the right,
upon request, to a jury trial (a right guaranteed by ICRA).266 Although the
tribe had a procedure in place for providing a jury trial upon request to
defendants, the petitioner claimed he was denied that right because the tribe
failed to inform him that he needed to request a jury. 267 Although neither
ICRA nor the tribe’s procedure required notice of the right to a jury trial
upon request, the Ninth Circuit, instead of deferring to the tribal court
judgment on this point, resolved the issue under a due process balancing
test.268 Applying that test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the petitioner’s
interest in fair treatment outweighed the tribe’s procedural interests, the
lack of notice amounted to the denial of the jury, and that denial of a jury

264. Compare In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (E.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that a
criminal defendant contesting tribal detention jurisdiction on ground that he was not an
Indian is not required to exhaust tribal court remedies before seeking federal habeas relief)
with Tah-Bone, 962 F. Supp. at 1434 (holding that a member of the Cherokee Tribe is not
relieved from ICRA’s requirement that he exhaust remedies available in Ute Tribal Court of
Appeals, and that it is sufficient that tribal court have “apparent” or “colorable” jurisdiction).
265. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730-31 (1991), modified, Martinez v. Ryan,
566 U.S. 1 (2012) (“In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate
state ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism. Without the rule, a
federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this Court could not do on direct
review; habeas would offer state prisoners whose custody was supported by independent and
adequate state grounds an end run around the limits of this Court's jurisdiction and a means
to undermine the State's interest in enforcing its laws.”).
266. 835 F.3d 1024 (2016).
267. Id. at 1029.
268. See Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1988).
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right was a structural error that required automatic reversal.269 It is hard to
imagine a federal court reaching the same result in habeas review of a state
court conviction under the AEDPA.
III. The Constitutional Ineffective Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard
Interpreted Through ICRA Habeas Review: Parallel Universe
or Unchartered Territory?
Along with requiring tribal courts to provide counsel to indigent
defendants at public expense on similar, but not identical, terms as the Sixth
Amendment, the TLOA and VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA further
require tribal courts “provide” TLOA and VAWA 2013 defendants “the
right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by
the United States Constitution.”270 As explained, under contemporary
jurisprudence, the “right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by
the United States Constitution” is grounded in a criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to enjoy the assistance of counsel, not due process.271
Additionally, it is measured exclusively by the two-prong test the Supreme
Court adopted in its 1984 Strickland decision. By referencing an established
and long-standing federal constitutional standard, Congress has
unmistakably tethered ICRA’s right to effective assistance of counsel
provision to the Sixth Amendment standard articulated in Strickland.272
In considering whether Congress intended ICRA’s new right to effective
assistance of counsel to be co-extensive with the Sixth Amendment, it
should be noted that, unlike provisions in ICRA that Congress imported
word for word from the Bill of Rights, 273 the wording of the new ICRA
269. In dissent, Judge O'Scannlain contended that the balancing due process test of
Randall was inappropriate, and that the claim should be resolved exclusively under ICRA,
which contains no affirmative duty to inform a defendant of his right to a jury trial upon
request. 835 F.3d at 1031-37.
270. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1) (2012).
271. See supra text accompanying note 33.
272. It remains to be seen how much of the secondary jurisprudence and issues that
inhabit Strickland’s margins came with it into ICRA, or how this new ICRA guarantee will
intermesh with existing tribal court procedures and custom.
273. United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other
grounds, Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (“ICRA[] imposes obligations on the Indian
tribes that are substantially similar to those imposed on the states by the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment [some of which] . . . tracks the language of some Constitutional
provisions word for word—for example, Indian tribes are prohibited from ‘abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition for a redress of grievances . . . .’”).
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provision does not track the Sixth Amendment. Rather, the text of ICRA’s
new effective assistance of counsel provision requires tribal courts to
“provide” TLOA defendants “the right to effective assistance of counsel at
least equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution.”274 By
doing so, Congress appears to have created a tribal court right to effective
assistance of counsel that will contract and expand with, and be delimited
by, Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.275 If nothing else, the fact that
Congress explicitly linked the new right to effective assistance of counsel in
tribal court to an existing federal constitutional standard lends support to
the argument that other provisions not so linked should be decoupled from
federal constitutional analysis.276
On its face, a requirement that a tribe provide criminal defendants the
right to effective assistance of counsel is not very controversial. There is
not much of a lobby for incompetent attorneys and, generally speaking,
leveling the playing field for litigants in court proceedings appeals to basic
274. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1).
275. This is consistent with Congress’s approach to the statutory right to appointed
counsel in federal court, which it expressly linked to the Sixth Amendment. The federal
Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (“CJA") requires appointment of counsel for indigent federal
defendants charged with felonies or Class A misdemeanors. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012).
Congress passed the CJA on the heels of the Court’s 1963 decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.
Under the CJA, federal district courts must provide counsel to any financially eligible person
who “is entitled to appointment of counsel under the sixth amendment to the Constitution.”
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(H). This provision requires federal district courts to appoint
counsel to indigents guided by the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination of when an indigent
federal defendant is entitled to counsel at public expense without further statutory
intervention by Congress. Since Congress linked the statutory right to the constitutional right
in federal court by statute, issues concerning the constitutional entitlement to counsel at
public expense almost invariably arise in the context of challenges to state, not federal,
convictions. As with Strickland claims, most Sixth Amendment jurisprudence fixing the
parameters of the right to counsel at public expense has developed in the context of federal
habeas review of state court convictions.
276. ICRA Reconsidered, supra note 219, at 1730 (“[T]raditional statutory interpretation
also tends to show that the provisions of ICRA are intentionally left ambiguous for tribes to
imbue with their own meanings. By way of illustration, the TLOA added a provision to
ICRA requiring that, in cases involving terms of imprisonment greater than one year, tribes
must provide ‘the right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by
the United States Constitution.’ No other provision directly ties the rights in ICRA to those
in the Federal Constitution.”). ICRA’s catch-all provision, of course, complicates this
analysis because it requires tribal courts seeking to impose a term of imprisonment of any
length to extend “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution . . . in
order for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe to
exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction.” 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d).
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notions of fair play. If one agrees that, once a government charges a person
with a crime, the government should not be able to prevent her from
employing an agent to advocate for her in answering the allegations against
her, and if one further ascribes to the Strickland adversarial construct of
justice, in which justice is achieved when criminal allegations are put to the
test by vigorous advocacy, it is not a huge leap to require the government
who brought the accusations to pay for advocates for defendants too poor to
pay for one, so they too can secure justice. Once one embraces the
proposition that poor people should not be deprived of the opportunity to
challenge the government’s allegations by virtue of their poverty, it follows
that the government should not be able to dilute the right to assistance of
counsel by providing incompetent advocates. However, this is not what
ICRA says. Instead, all it says is that tribes must provide TLOA and
VAWA 2013 defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel at least
equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution. “Effective
assistance of counsel” is a constitutional term of art, with the very precise
meaning given to it in Strickland. Strickland does not deem counsel
ineffective unless the defendant shows both that counsel’s conduct fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness in making a decision that is
not entitled to deference, and that the defendant was prejudiced thereby to
such an extent that it calls into question the reliability of the result of the
adversarial process. Thus, “the right to effective assistance of counsel at
least equal to that guaranteed by the . . . Constitution,” as currently
interpreted by the Supreme Court, actually tolerates incompetence and
inactivity by defense counsel, as long as it does not seriously undermine
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.277 By importing the
Strickland standard into ICRA, Congress has set the minimum requirement
in tribal court as non-seriously prejudicial incompetent counsel, precisely
what the Constitution guarantees state and federal court defendants. 278
277. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 20-21 (1997) (“To put it another way, ineffective
assistance doctrine tolerates a very low activity level by defense attorneys. The law operates
from the premise that effective representation can be minimal—as in many cases it can.
(Think about the many plea-bargained cases that are resolved based on a few minutes'
meeting between defense counsel and her client and a similarly brief meeting between
defense counsel and the prosecutor.) Once that proposition is granted, it becomes difficult to
separate low-activity but good representation from laziness or incompetence. Current Sixth
Amendment doctrine responds by basing findings of ineffective assistance mostly on
identifiable gross errors rather than on inactivity.”).
278. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting on
denial of writ of certiorari) (“Ten years after the articulation of [the Strickland] standard,
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As with the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, the
contours of ICRA’s new federal right to effective assistance of counsel in
tribal court will eventually be shaped through federal habeas litigation.
Thus, the availability of relief and the level of scrutiny to which federal
courts will subject tribal court dispositions of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims will ultimately determine what effective assistance of
counsel in tribal court looks like. Under the federal double deference review
of state Strickland claims, federal courts will not grant relief on a state
prisoner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if there is at least “any
reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential
standard.”279
Depending on whether federal courts approach petitions from tribal
convictions with the same hands-off attitude with which they currently
approach state prisoner petitions, the result for tribal court prisoners may be
indistinguishable from those of state court prisoners. If, however, federal
courts apply more lenient post-conviction review standards and procedures
to petitions challenging tribal court convictions, tribal prisoners will be able
to obtain relief more readily than their state counterparts for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. In this way, federal court habeas review of
tribal court ineffective assistance of counsel claims may produce a more
robust, or at least a different, right to effective assistance counsel for tribal
court defendants, notwithstanding Congress’s clear intent that ICRA’s new
tribal court right to effective assistance of counsel would be tied to the
federal constitutional standard.
Putting aside the technical question of the extent to which Strickland’s
deference and extreme prejudice requirements will drive federal habeas
review of tribal convictions in the same way it has dominated federal
review of state convictions, Congress’s wholesale importation of the
Strickland standard into ICRA presents a much weightier substantive
question: what is effective lawyering in the tribal context under ICRA? Or,
in Strickland-speak: what does it mean to be a lawyer whose conduct does
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness as measured against
the prevailing practice in the community? Applying this standard requires,
as a threshold matter, identification of the reference “community” whose

practical experience establishes that the Strickland test, in application, has failed to protect a
defendant’s right to be represented by something more than ‘a person who happens to be a
lawyer.’”).
279. Harrington v. Richter, 528 U.S. 86, 105 (2011); see also Moore v. Hardee, 723 F.3d
488, 495-97 (4th Cir. 2013).
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“prevailing practices” will inform the analysis.280 Is the “community” just
advocates of a particular tribe?281 Does it include lay advocates? Can the
community include neighboring or nearby tribes? All tribes in a given
region? In the United States? Is it limited to related tribes or tribes with
compatible notions of justice? Given that federal courts routinely exercise
jurisdiction over serious crimes in Indian Country under the Major Crimes
Act, including some of the types of crimes that also fall under tribes’
concurrent VAWA 2013 jurisdiction, does the “community” include the
federal bar? Does the “community” include the bar of the state in which a
tribal reservation is physically located? And, critically, what happens when
a nearby tribe or state follows different practices?282 By adopting a
nationalized standard that also incorporates local notions of professional
competence, it appears Congress left room for individualized tribal
approaches in evaluating what will be deemed objectively reasonably under
the circumstances.283 It remains to be seen what level of deference federal
280. Identifying the reference “community’ is the threshold issue in fair jury rights
analysis as well. See Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 709, 757 (2006) (“Attempting to achieve “a fair cross-section of the community”
begs the most important question: what community?”).
281. See Creel, supra note 193, at 357-58 (“The adversary system was a foreign system
imposed on tribes … Unfortunately, outside counsel often do not have the requisite training
or advocacy skill necessary for a competent criminal defense because the practice of
criminal law and Indian law are highly specialized. No matter how competent an attorney
may be in his or her field, there is no guarantee of transferable skills to provide competent
assistance in a criminal proceeding.”) (footnote omitted).
282. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 86, § 11.10(b) (“This is not to suggest that what
constitutes reasonably effective assistance might not vary from one jurisdiction to another,
as obligations imposed by local law may well be considered in determining what is needed
to provide effective assistance. Thus, state courts have divided as to whether counsel’s
failure to advise defendant that his guilty plea could result in deportation constitutes
ineffective assistance.”) (citing Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1987)). But see Padilla
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (subsequently holding that when “the deportation
consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally clear”); Lee v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (recently holding that when a petitioner pleads guilty
based on incompetent advice regarding the immigration consequences of his plea,
Strickland’s prejudice prong is met).
283. The legislative history for this provision provides some insight into Congress’s
intention, but still does not indicate how differences will be resolved. See Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904, 127 Stat. 54, 120-23; Pilot
Project for Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes of Domestic Violence, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,645,
71,655 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (stating that tribal lawyers “will compare favorably to ...
the state or local . . . defense attorneys who participate in similar criminal proceedings”).
Given this, and in light of Strickland’s mandate to look to prevailing professional norms in
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courts will extend to tribes’ own assessment of what constitutes effective
lawyering in their own courts.
Strickland offers a very clear vision of the proper role of counsel under
the Constitution—to ensure the proper functioning of the American
criminal justice system by testing the prosecution’s case through vigorous
and adversarial advocacy.284 It is the abandonment or incompetent
the community, tribal governments operating under the VAWA 2013 provisions who have
not done so would be well-advised to develop and document defense standards for their
respective jurisdictions so there is no confusion about what that community considers to be
acceptable professional practice. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 86, § 11.10(b) (“As the
Court noted in [Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)] ‘the [critical] question is whether
an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence under “prevailing professional
norms,” not whether it deviates from best practices or most common custom.’ Insofar as
customary practice and professional norms overlap, the performance guidelines most helpful
in establishing customary practice are likely to be those prescribed on a state level rather
than on national level, especially the ‘performance standards’ prescribed by agencies having
supervisory authority over all government-funded counsel for indigent defendants.”)
(footnotes and citations omitted); see also Blackburn & Marsh, The New Performance
Guidelines in Criminal Cases: A New Step for Texas Criminal Justice, 74 TEX. B.J. 616
(2011) (listing state-level guidelines and standards) (cited in LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 86).
284. In the holding portion of the Strickland opinion, the Court uses the terms
“adversary” and “adversarial” repeatedly to describe defense counsel’s role in a criminal
prosecution and the type of prejudice the constitutional standard is concerned with. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“Thus, a fair trial is one in which
evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of
issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the
adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel’s skill and
knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the ‘ample opportunity to meet the case of the
prosecution’ to which they are entitled.”); id. (“The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right
to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the
ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.”); id. at 686 (“The benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.”); id. at 687 (“A capital sentencing proceeding like the one involved
in this case . . . is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of
standards for decision that counsel’s role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel’s role at
trial—to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the
standards governing decision.”) (citation omitted); id. at 687 (“Unless a defendant makes
both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”); id. at 688 (“The
Sixth Amendment refers simply to ‘counsel,’ not specifying particular requirements of
effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal profession’s maintenance of standards
sufficient to justify the law’s presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary
process that the Amendment envisions.”); id. (“Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such
skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.”); id. at
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performance of this role in such a way that it seriously impacts the result of
the proceedings that offends the Constitution. Thus, Strickland identifies
the “problem” of ineffective assistance of counsel not as a betrayal of the
client, but as a failure of counsel to adequately fulfill an assigned role in an
adversarial process to such an extent that it produces unreliable results. 285
Arguably, that construct works where a community agrees that an
adversarial process in which the defense counsel and the prosecutor battle
under the supervision of a neutral and disinterested umpire will produce just
and reliable results.286 But what if a community does not share the same
concept of fairness and justice that informs the federal constitutional
standard? What if a community’s approach to justice does not rely on an
690 (stating that, in evaluating defense counsel’s effectiveness, “court[s] should keep in
mind that counsel’s function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the
adversarial testing process work in the particular case”); id. at 696 (“In every case the court
should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of
the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process
that our system counts on to produce just results.”); id. at 700 (“[R]espondent has made no
showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the
adversary process caused by deficiencies in counsel’s assistance.”) (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 685-86 (“The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of
counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the
adversarial system to produce just results . . . the benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”);
see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1984) (“The very premise of our
adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.”)
(quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477
U.S. 365, 384 (1986) (advising that, in making competency determinations, a court “should
keep in mind that counsel’s function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to
make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case”).
286. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “adversary” as one that contends with,
opposes, or resists: an enemy or opponent. Adversary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adversary (last visited Mar. 2, 2018). It
derives from the Latin adjective adversaries, which means “turned toward” or “antagonistic
toward’. Id. It defines “adversarial” as “involving two people or two sides who oppose each
other: of, relating to, or characteristic of an adversary or adversary procedures. Id. Of
interest, this dictionary uses the example of the American juvenile justice system as an
example of “adversarial” in a sentence. Id. (“As a result, the juvenile-court system operates
according to a parental rather than adversarial process, an informal, ad hoc judicial process
governed by a supposedly benevolent and paternal juvenile court.”) (citing Jessica Lahey,
The Children Being Denied Due Process, ATLANTIC (May 22, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/05/the-children-being-denied-dueprocess/527448/).
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adversarial resolution of disputes or an adversarial model of criminal
justice?287 What if, as is the case with some tribal courts, an advocate is not
required to be a licensed lawyer to be considered competent to assist an
accused?288 How a community defines reliable results, the proper role of
advocates and decision-makers, and ultimately, what it considers “justice,”
goes to deep questions of community self-identity and self-determination.
The extent to which federal courts accommodate and respect the choices,
determinations, and practices of state and tribal governments in their efforts
to achieve justice for people under their jurisdiction ultimately relates back
to the ongoing discussion about the proper role of the federal government
vis-à-vis other sovereigns.
Another open question is what tribal and federal courts will do with the
requirement that a tribal court exercising VAWA 2013 jurisdiction provide
the defendant “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the
Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and

287. See Creel, supra note 193, at 341 (“The adversary system was a foreign system
imposed on tribes.”); ICRA Reconsidered, supra note 219, at 1717 (“Many tribes have
nontraditional (in the sense of being unlike their federal or state counterparts) justice systems
that include restorative justice schemes, where the presence of a lawyer may serve to
antagonize or heighten tensions.”); see also United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 780 (6th
Cir. 1997) (“‘[U]ntil the middle of this century, few Indian tribes maintained any semblance
of a formal court system. Offenses by one Indian against another were usually handled by
social and religious pressure and not by formal judicial processes; emphasis was on
restitution rather than punishment.’ The underlying premise of an adversarial system is
simply absent throughout many of the tribes . . . . [In enacting ICRA,] Congress had
testimony before it that many tribal courts do not even hire prosecutors. The right to counsel
created by ICRA should not be interpreted in a way that would cause considerable damage
to such informal systems; therefore, we consider it highly unlikely that Congress wished that
such systems be subject to [a] . . . rule that presumes the existence of an adversarial method
of trying criminal cases.”) (citations omitted).
It is also fair to ask whether Strickland analysis is even coherent in the plea-bargaining
context, the forum in which the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are
resolved. Unlike a trial or contested sentencing hearing, plea bargaining is a negotiation
process (albeit a lopsided one), with compromise as its objective that takes place outside the
courtroom and under the judiciary’s radar, not the adversarial showdown under the
supervision of a trial court described in Strickland.
288. Jackson v. Tracy, No. CV 11-00448-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 3704698 (D. Ariz. Aug.
28, 2012) (holding ICRA’s general assistance-of-counsel guarantee requires neither that
one’s advocate be a licensed attorney nor that the advocate be held to the Strickland standard
of a reasonably effective attorney) (“[I]n a system that permits representation of criminal
defendants by non-lawyers with no legal training, [a non-lawyer’s] performance should be
compared, if at all, to the standards for other non-lawyers appearing in tribal court.”).
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affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe.”289 The legislative
history of this “constitutional catch-all” provision sheds some light on its
intended purpose, to wit, to preserve some flexibility to courts in tailoring
procedural protections to special or unanticipated issues that may arise as
tribal courts begin to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians for the first time
in generations.290 This flexibility, however, carries with it the risk that
federal courts will interpret the provision as an invitation to exercise a
heightened level of scrutiny over tribal court decisions relative to state court
decisions.
Conclusion
One of the single most important and enduring questions under ICRA is
whether and to what extent the protections Congress requires tribes to
extend to tribal court defendants must mirror federal constitutional
counterparts.291 This includes questions of substantive law, such as whether
ICRA’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are coextensive with the Fourth Amendment. But it also includes procedural
289. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (2012).
290. The legislative history for § 1304 provides some insight into Congress’s intent in
including paragraph (4) of § 1304(d), the “constitutional catch-all” provision. See Pilot
Project for Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes of Domestic Violence, 78 Fed. Reg. 71645,
71649 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (stating that, in including § 1304(d), “Congress
recognized . . . that the understanding of which rights are fundamental to our justice system
can evolve over time”) (“This provision does not require tribal courts to protect all federal
constitutional rights that federal courts are required to protect (for example, the Fifth
Amendment's grand-jury indictment requirement, which state courts are also not required to
protect). Rather, paragraph (4) gives courts the flexibility to expand the list of protected
rights to include a right whose protection the 113th Congress did not foresee as essential to
the exercise of [special domestic violence jurisdiction].”).
291. Compare, e.g., Alvarez v. Tracy, 773 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Because the
ICRA, by its plain language, requires a defendant to request a jury, it differs significantly
from the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”) with id. at 1035 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(preferring to apply Sixth Amendment precedent as opposed to the tribe’s “rough and tumble
justice”); see also Doherty, 126 F.3d at 779-80 (“[T]hose courts that have considered ICRA
have held that constitutional law precedents applicable to the federal and state governments
do not necessarily apply ‘jot-for-jot’ to the tribes. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, which is
charged . . . with ensuring that the tribes perform their obligations under federal contracts in
accordance with ICRA, has also recognized that a wholesale incorporation of federal
constitutional standards would be unwise. Furthermore, those courts charged under Santa
Clara Pueblo with the primary responsibility for interpreting ICRA, the tribal courts, have
also declined to import federal standards into the tribal context wholesale.”) (citations
omitted).
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questions, such as the level of deference federal courts should, or must,
extend to tribal court determinations on habeas review. In the absence of
statutory guidance, federal courts have been left to develop a tribal court
habeas common law jurisprudence around these questions,292 a
jurisprudence that sometimes appears to mirror federal pre-AEDPA
common law.293
Congress has conferred broader rights to non-Indian tribal court
defendants under the TLOA and VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA than
those required for Indian tribal court defendants under the general
provisions of that same statute. In some instances, it has also granted TLOA
and VAWA 2013 defendants rights greater than those enjoyed by state and
federal court defendants under the U.S. Constitution. The question now is
whether federal courts, in interpreting these ICRA amendments through the
ICRA habeas provision, will show the same solicitousness to non-Indian

292. ICRA Reconsidered, supra note 219, at 1709 (“Among the motivations behind
ICRA were desires to protect individual Indians from “[p]ower hungry” tribal governments
and to bring the protections of the Bill of Rights to Indians on reservations. In crafting the
legislation, Congress made a number of adjustments in an attempt to respect tribes, including
abandoning the explicit demand that tribes follow federal constitutional norms and
restricting review to habeas corpus applications. After Santa Clara Pueblo, an uneasy
compromise was struck: federal review persisted but was limited to habeas review, leaving
tribal courts as the primary fora for rights claims.”).
293. See Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 900-01 (2d Cir.
1996) (“[T]here is simply no room in our constitutional order for the definition of basic
rights on the basis of cultural affiliations, even with respect to those communities whose
distinctive ‘sovereignty’ our country has long recognized and sustained.”); Alvarez, 773 F.3d
at 1021 (“[R]esolution of statutory issues under the ICRA will ‘frequently depend on
questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may be in a better position to
evaluate than federal courts.’” (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71
(1978))); cf. United States v. Lester, 647 F. 2d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 1981) (“In light of the
legislative history of the Indian Civil Rights Act and its striking similarity to the language of
the Constitution, we consider the problem before us under Fourth Amendment standards.”
(citation omitted)). In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Supreme Court cautioned against the danger
of unintended consequences in interpreting federal laws in the context of tribal traditions
unfamiliar to federal courts: “Given the often vast gulf between tribal traditions and those
with which federal courts are more intimately familiar, the judiciary should not rush to
create causes of action that would intrude on these delicate matters.” 436 U.S. at 72 n.32.
Professor Garrow notes that the concept of “[t]he privilege of habeas corpus” as a right of
citizenship “has been vigorously debated;” citing Congress’s unsuccessful attempt to deprive
federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction over non-citizen enemy combatants being
detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States. See Garrow, supra note 231, at
150-53.
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petitioners seeking review of tribal court convictions in federal court.294
Regardless of Congress’s intent, apart from the new stay of detention
provision, ICRA post-VAWA 2013 habeas procedure contains no guidance
or limitations on federal courts’ ability to apply habeas doctrines such as
default, deference, exhaustion, or time limitations, or definitions of critical
concepts, such as “custody.” This leaves federal courts to their pre-VAWA
2013 tribal habeas common law. It is an open question whether some of
those habeas doctrines, which reflect a deference to tribal dispositions of
claims brought by Indians, will be applied equally to habeas petitions
brought by non-Indians.
ICRA’s habeas provision was part of the original statute passed in 1968.
When Congress enacted ICRA’s habeas provision it did so against a
background of federal court habeas review of state court convictions
radically different from that which exists today. The most important
change, for the purposes of the issues identified in this article, is the
evolution of the state deference doctrine. When the habeas statute was first
enacted, federal courts extended nearly absolute deference to state court
judgments.295 The Supreme Court incrementally and eventually relaxed this
standard and opened federal court review of state court convictions by
employing less deferential standards of review. At one point, the Court
permitted federal court review of state court convictions unless the prisoner
had been given a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate his federal
constitutional claims.296 Beginning in 1953 and until Congress passed
AEDPA in 1996, although deference was given to state court resolution of
factual issues, federal courts reviewed federal constitutional claims de

294. Professor Garrow concludes that in the habeas context, the federal courts’ deference
to tribal courts is citizenship based. See Garrow, supra note 231, at 152-53 (“The federal
courts’ failure to require tribal remedies when the defendants are non-Indian stems from [a]
concept of citizenship” as a limitation on tribal power articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Oliphant) (citing and quoting Duthu, who likened this concept of citizenship and reliance
on the notion of individual rights of personal liberty to the “‘protective cloak’ of nationality
that early colonizers used to insulate themselves from the laws of indigenous peoples. . . .
The nationality that clung like a protective cloak to these settlers also brought with it the
jurisdiction of their sovereigns wherever they happened to settle.”).
295. See Dorf, supra note 233 (“Habeas relief was available if a prisoner was subject to
state executive detention, but if the prisoner had had a state trial—even a flawed one—
federal courts were reluctant to grant habeas relief, so long as the state court had had proper
jurisdiction over the case.”).
296. Id.
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novo.297 AEDPA, as noted, resuscitated a highly deferential standard of
review and represented a major recalibration of the federal-state judicial
equilibrium.298 Thus, a lot has happened in the habeas landscape since
Congress passed ICRA’s habeas provision. TLOA imported the single most
important claim in habeas jurisprudence—ineffective assistance of
counsel—and tethered it to the federal constitutional standard. But it left
open how federal courts must approach those claims on habeas review in a
post-AEDPA world.299
Until now, habeas review of tribal court convictions was relatively rare
as a result of tribal court’s limited sentencing power and the relatively small
number of tribal court convictions in the United States (as compared with
the number of state convictions).300 Since tribal courts could not impose a
sentence of more than one year and only a person who is being detained can
seek habeas relief, there was a good chance that a tribal prisoner would
serve out his sentence before he could exhaust his tribal court remedies and

297. Id. (“[F]or a roughly forty-year period beginning with the 1953 ruling in Brown v.
Allen [until the Supreme Court began reining in federal court review and Congress passed
AEDPA in 1996], federal courts decided legal questions on their own.”).
298. Id. (“Perhaps the most significant new limit was AEDPA’s overruling of Brown v.
Allen. Under AEDPA, federal courts no longer determine whether state courts correctly
rejected a habeas petitioner’s federal claims; they only grant relief if the state courts applied
federal law unreasonably—a deferential standard.”).
299. ICRA Reconsidered, supra note 219, at 1719-20 (“The question of who the ultimate
determiner of rights should be cannot remain an ominous sword of Damocles, dangling over
tribal courts and threatening at any moment to destroy their jurisprudence. If Congress is
seeking to provide federal rights in the same way to Indians as to non-Indians, it is failing. In
the same vein, if Congress instead is trying to empower tribes to protect civil rights in their
own way, the uncertainty surrounding ICRA is causing tribes to hesitate and some federal
courts to return to federal jurisprudence as a guide to ICRA’s provisions.”) (citing Poodry v.
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 900 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting influence of
“cultural relativism” on ICRA interpretation in favor of “general American legal norms
[and] certain universal principles”)); Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897,
900 (9th Cir. 1988) (suggesting a balancing approach “[w]here the tribal court procedures
under scrutiny differ significantly from those ‘commonly employed in Anglo-Saxon
society”’ (quoting Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 529 F.2d
233, 238 (9th Cir. 1976))).
300. AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 170, § 7:7 (“Since Martinez, there
have been a relatively small number of decisions addressing the scope of or the entitlement
to the habeas corpus remedy.”). As noted, Martinez established that ICRA’s habeas
provision is the sole avenue for challenging tribal court decisions in federal court. See supra
note 82.
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seek federal habeas review.301 Now that Congress has authorized tribal
sentences of up to nine years and jurisdiction over non-Indians, as well as
created a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the issues identified
here will likely reach the federal courts more often. When it passed TLOA
and VAWA 2013 to update and constitutionalize ICRA, Congress left some
unfinished business—namely, explaining how those new protections should
be reviewed by federal courts consistent with the federal commitment to
tribal sovereignty and self-determination. As it has done in the context of
federal habeas review of state court convictions with AEDPA, Congress has
both the prerogative and the responsibility to ensure that federal courts will
extend the deference necessary to tribal court determinations to protect and
promote those federal policies.

301. Pre-TLOA tribal courts often worked around the one-year cap by stacking multiple
one-year sentences to produce a longer sentence. But the resulting sentences were still
relatively short compared to state court sentences. See, e.g., Bustamante v. Valenzuela, 715
F. Supp. 2d 960, 965 (D. Ariz. 2010) (“ICRA’s limitation of a one-year imprisonment for
‘any one offense’ means a tribe may impose a one-year term of imprisonment for each
violation of a criminal statute. As it is undisputed that Petitioner committed multiple
criminal violations, and that he was not sentenced to more than one year on any individual
violation, his eighteen month sentence did not violate ICRA.”).
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